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Universities are at the forefront of tackling climate change and progressing sustainability measures. 
Campuses around the world address these issues from various perspectives: empirical and 
theoretical studies, developing interdisciplinary fields and serving as experimentation hubs2. More 
and more universities are engaged in networks, both with the public and private stakeholders and 
other higher education institutes. 
The University Alliance for Sustainability (UAS) exists for these purposes. The UAS is a 
network of five leading universities from different continents: Freie Universität Berlin (Germany), 
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem (Israel), Peking University (China), St. Petersburg University 
(Russia) and the University of British Columbia (Canada). The network aims to exchange and spread 
research and knowledge on broad aspects of sustainability, as well as engaging in on-campus 
sustainability measures3.  
Under the theme “do universities matter?” the UAS first Spring Campus event took place in 
2016 at the Freie Universität Berlin. Representatives from the Alliance’s universities presented their 
ongoing research in three focus areas: climate governance, education for sustainable development 
and sustainable watershed management. The spring campus event also held a PhD students 
conference, in which early career researchers from the five universities presented their research 
projects.   
This publication gathers 12 contributions presented in the spring campus “Workshop I: 
Climate Governance in International Comparison”4, and in the PhD students’ conference. Other than 
providing conference proceedings, this publication fulfils one more goal: sampling several trends in 
climate change and sustainability research taking place at these five top universities. Presenting a 
mix of works from different fields and disciplines by experienced and early career researchers 
enables a unique and fresh outlook on these trends and hints at several future fields of interests. 
Reading through these papers also points to how, and why, universities matter.   
The first three publications examine major actors in global climate negotiation and policies, 
                                                              
1  Ira Shefer is a PhD candidate, Environmental Policy Research Center (FFU), Freie Universität Berlin; 
shefer.ira.mail@gmail.com 
2 See for instance selected publications in the Journal of Environmental Studies and Sciences 2016, 6 (2). 
3 http://www.fu-berlin.de/en/sites/uas/about-us/index.html 
4 Organized by Prof. Miranda Schreurs (Head of the Environmental Policy Research Center [FFU] at the Freie 
Universität Berlin, until October 2016) 
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addressing mainly state-level (national) and international aspects: Prof. Qingzhi Huan (Peking 
University) examines the new position of China regarding global climate action. He claims that the 
up-to-date development of China’s global climate policy, especially its active participation in 
reaching and approving the Paris Agreement, is both situational and stage-making. In other words, 
China is now becoming an active player in global climate politics, but is unlikely to accept a role as 
a world-leader in the foreseeable future. Accordingly, he finds that China will gradually shift its 
profile in global climate governance from moral responsibility to political and legal ones. Dr. Irina 
Shmeleva (ITMO University and Institute of Sustainable Development Strategy [ANO], Saint 
Petersburg) presents highlights of Russia’s climate policies as they are reflected in the media. She 
finds that climate change issues are framed mainly in scientific topics rather than political ones, 
with changing patterns of public interest in this issue. Next is Dr. Dörte Ohlhorst (Freie Universität 
Berlin), who examines Germany’s energy transition under a multi-level governance approach and 
identifies specific aspects of a successful energy transition.  
 Jan Beermann and Dr. Kerstin Tews (Freie Universität Berlin) explore the domestic sphere in 
greater detail: they analyse the role of and potential for decentralised experimentation in the 
German energy transition, and in particular the acceptance and implementation of renewable 
energy projects at the sub-national level in Germany.  
 The next three publications go deeper into the local, municipal level. Dr. Nikolai Bobylev (St. 
Petersburg State University) examines possible conflicts between climate adaptation, resilience and 
sustainability concepts in urban (infrastructure) development, which affects urban climate 
governance. He finds that while these conflicts do exist, possibilities for synergies are available. The 
following contributor, Gloria Amoruso (Freie Universität Berlin), tests the notion of Berlin as an 
urban climate leader, confronting climate policies developed and adopted in the city against low 
performances in reducing GHG emissions. She concludes by identifying several factors that, 
nevertheless, point to the existing potential for urban leadership by the city. The last contributors 
focusing on the local level are Nicole Mahlkow and Tobias Kalt (Freie Universität Berlin), who 
critically assess Berlin’s urban heat discourses. They find, among other things, that Berlin’s 
adaptation policies maintain a status quo rather than striving for more structural social acceptance 
of climate change adaptation. Within this process, for example, some local groups are marginalized 
and some ideas and policies are presented as preferable over other, deeper solutions.   
From the local contributions we move to cross-national, regional frames: The European 
Union (EU) and the Association of East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Tina Schivatcheva (Freie 
Universität Berlin) reviews the role of the EU’s institutions and legislation in the successful 
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development and implementation of pan-European conservation initiatives, particularly the 
Natura2000 initiative. She discusses opportunities and tensions embedded within both the 
internal and external facets of the union, perceiving them as complementary in the achievement 
of the desired conservation goals. Dian Parluhutan (Freie Universität Berlin) looks at energy law 
in ASEAN countries, while reflecting on the EU’s energy laws.  
The last three contributions present just a fraction of the UAS universities’ research in the 
natural sciences and in-campus sustainability practices. Nurit Eliash (and colleague authors; the 
Hebrew University of Jerusalem) presents a solution to mite infestation in bees in a way that does 
not harm the bees or the mites, thus reducing the harmful effects of chemical pesticides. Donghai 
Wu (Peking University) presents ongoing research on improving the assessment of deforestation, 
using the South-Western American territory as a case study. He finds that improved assessments of 
deforestation could provide scientists with a better picture to present to policy makers when trying 
to articulate sustainable forestry methods. Dr. Susan Gerofsky (University of British Columbia) 
concludes this publication with a presentation and assessment of case studies of in-campus 
sustainability projects that, she claims, provide a more holistic, comprehensive and – importantly – 
realistic frame to research and progress sustainability. Despite not being part of “Workshop I”, her 
presentation provides a living example of what universities can do in order to connect sustainability 
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Theoretically, the following three factors will jointly determine whether and how China is to 
take a more active role in global climate policy. First, China’s total amount of greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions, which have evident negative impacts domestically and globally. Second, demonstration 
effects of the industrial countries, who convincingly and fruitfully implement the related 
international conventions and make their own other efforts. Third, the ever-enhancing national eco-
awareness, which will reach a point strong enough to cause a comprehensive policy-reorientation 
(Tian 2014; Bo 2013). Based on such a general understanding, this article will offer a brief review of 
China’s participation in global climate governance by focusing on the following three questions: 
How to conceptualize China’s participation in global climate governance, its policy as well as ethical 
dimensions; How to interpret the heritage of the Copenhagen Summit regarding China, and; How to 
evaluate China’s recent efforts in moving towards a new stage of climate governance participation 
considering its share in negotiation and signature on the Paris Agreement. 
 
Conceptualizing China’s participation in global climate governance 
 
If defining a country’s participation in global climate governance as a process of combining 
moral, political and legal responsibilities or obligations, we can divide China’s involvement in the 
UN-led climate governance system into the following three stages: 1972-1992, 1992-2015 and 2015-
#2030 (Xu and Chen 2013; Niu and Wang 2013). In every stage, China presents itself as a different, 
separate actor or ‘responsibility-undertaker’. 
During 1972-1992, though the Chinese government participated in numerous international 
activities coping with global environmental issues (including the first global summit on 
environment in Stockholm in 1972), China was largely regarded as an ‘outsider participant’ in the 
sense that there was not much to blame on, politically and legally in particular. In other words, 
China’s economic development or poverty eradication was a commonly recognized priority 
comparing with its contribution to global environmental protection. 
In comparison, from 1992 to 2015, China as a developing country has only non-binding 
                                                              
1 Dr. Qingzhi Huan is a professor of comparative politics at Peking University, China. He was a visiting scholar 
of 2002/2003 at the Harvard-Yenching Institute, Harvard University, a Humboldt Research Fellow of 2005/2006 
at MZES, University of Mannheim and a CSC high visiting scholar at ANU, among others. His major research 
interests are environmental politics, European politics and left politics; qzhuan@pku.edu.cn  
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obligations in industrial emission reduction according to the Kyoto Protocol, while as a rising new 
economic entity it experienced an ever-increasing international pressure throughout this period to 
show some active engagement or undertaking of responsibility. In these double senses, China was 
a passive participant in global climate governance system, bearing both moral and political 
responsibilities. 
Before and after 2015, with reflecting the frustrating result of the Copenhagen Summit as a 
turning point and together with the spilling-over effects of domestic politics, it seems that China 
intends to replace the strategy of rejecting any obligation-binding international treaty with a new 
strategy: to be an enthusiastic participant in constructing a post-Kyoto global system, including 
taking some binding obligations or full responsibilities (moral, political and legal). 
Unsurprisingly, dealing with the heritage of the Copenhagen Summit appropriately is the 
first step moving forward for China, constituting the division line between the second and the third 
stages of China’s participation in global climate governance (Zhang X. 2014; Xiao and Liu 2010). 
 
Table 1: The major stages of China’s participation in global climate governance* 
 1972-1992         1992-2015         2015-2030   
participation        passive           active 
as an outsider;    participation;      participation; 
no                non-binding       binding 
obligations         obligations        obligations 
 (Moral resp.)       (M/Political)       (M/P/Legal)   
* created by the author himself. 
 
Heritage of the Copenhagen Summit for China 
 
China’s major policy claims at the Copenhagen Summit in 2009 can be summarized as 
follows (Zhang H. 2009; Zhuang 2009). First, maintaining Kyoto Protocol’s two-track system rather 
than replacing it with a single-track system in international negotiation for industrial emissions 
reduction, which can be justified by the related items of the protocol and by the principle of 
‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ adopted at the Rio Summit in 1992. For China, at least 
in the period of 2012-2020 at which the Copenhagen Summit was targeting, merging the two tracks 
is out of the question. 
Second, the developed countries should undertake the major responsibilities in global 
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allocation of emissions reduction quota and provide the developing countries with substantial aids 
in clean technologies and financial resources. A key claim is that the advanced West should fulfill 
their commitments to reduce their absolute emissions by 25%~40% by 2020 and by 80% by 2050 
compare to the 1990 levels, while gradually increase their financial aid to the developing or 
ecologically fragile countries up to 0.5%~1% of their GDP. 
Third, adopting relative emission cut in per GDP unit instead of reduction in absolute or per 
capita amount, which can only be carried out voluntarily. In other words, China refuses to provide a 
clear road-map regarding how long time it still needs to become a net-contributor for global 
emission reduction, and rejects any calls for inspecting and supervising over its efforts in emissions 
reduction by Western or international organizations.  
At the final stage of negotiations in Copenhagen, there did appear some notable signs 
showing that China may moderate its policy claims at the last minute (Reference Daily, 15 December 
2009). Unfortunately, these policy suggestions calling for undertaking some ‘concrete’ 
responsibilities were not fully developed and incorporated in negotiations. 
Among the academics, Angang Hu, a well-known Chinese economist, wrote an open letter 
to the Chinese top leaders, appealing that China should immediately take a leading role in global 
climate governance by offering some kind of quantified road-map of emission reduction (Hu 2009a). 
Unsurprisingly, this letter did not win much credit for him among the Chinese government and 
academics. He was accused of being a political mouthpiece for the West and criticized for his (little) 
knowledge regarding the Copenhagen negotiations 2 . In addition, it is another famous Chinese 
economist, Yushi Mao, who pointed out that economic crisis should not be an excuse for China’s 
rejection of its global responsibility in emissions reduction. For him, assuming appropriate global 
responsibility is, first, a moral rather than just an economic issue, and there is no unconquerable 
difficulty for China to do so (Mao 2009). 
According to Angang Hu (2009b), in order to promote a global consensus on climate change 
and help produce binding targets for emissions reduction worldwide, two new principles should be 
introduced. First, all the nations should be assigned to one of the four categories in terms of their 
Human Development Index (HDI) ranking, rather than classified simply as developed or developing 
countries. Second, major GHG emitters should bear greater responsibility for emissions reduction. 
Taking these principles as the basis, he argues, China will become a member of High HDI group 
(above 0.8) around 2010 and then should be considered a non-conditional reducer of GHG emissions. 
                                                              
2 The author’s interviews with the vice editor-in-chief of Green Leaf (Beijing) on 15 March 2010 and Prof. 
Haibin Zhang (Peking University) on 27 April 2010. 
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Accordingly, a road-map of China’s emission reduction should look like this: Emissions of carbon 
dioxide will peak by 2020, and the total emission will be reduced to less than 2.2 billion tonnes by 
2030 and further to 1.1 billion tonnes by 2050, half of the 1990 level. 
By comparison, the academic proposition dominating China’s negotiation at Copenhagen is 
that Chinese government should not make any internationally binding commitment of emissions 
reduction in 2012-2020. According to Jiahua Pan (2009a), a leading policy consultant in this field 
from the Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS), this is because, first, climate change is also an 
issue of development rather than just an issue of environment; second, China is still not capable of 
cutting emissions dramatically; third, Western countries will unlikely provide technological and 
financial help to China for developing low-carbon economy and achieving emissions reduction. 
Consequently, he suggests, China should carry on a position in global climate negotiation retaining 
its own independence (Pan 2009b) or, in other words, ‘using the West-dominated slogan to serve 
China’s sustainable development’ (yiwoweizhu) (Ding 2009). 
Therefore, China’s policy position at Copenhagen can be best explained from a clearly-
defined Chinese perspective within a specific international context. What underlies the intense 
dispute between China and the West is a special Chinese version of understanding of the relations 
between global environment and development: Climate change mitigation and adaptation is 
becoming another field of international competition, and there are probably no so-called ‘win-win’ 
results. For China, what at stake is not only ecological security of the globe, but also its historical 
rights of development and long-term economic competitiveness in a globalizing world. As a result, 
together with other developing countries, China staunchly defended the conventional rights of 
development and development discourse, showing its greatly increased strength as a world 
economic power, while neglecting its rapidly highlighting mission of leading the protection of 
ecological public or global ‘good’ (Huan 2013).  
Thus, it is understandable that the primary reflections on the results of the Copenhagen 
Summit as well as China’s role in it focus on the following two questions. First, is the Copenhagen 
Accord a good enough achievement? Shortly after the summit, Premier Jiabao Wen said (2009) that 
the Copenhagen Accord is a good agreement in the sense that it was the result of arduous efforts 
made by many countries and it reconfirms the established basic goals and principles in global 
climate governance. At the same time, he also acknowledged that this agreement is far from being 
strong enough in terms of the necessity to reverse the trend of global climate change. Among the 
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Second, did China do something incorrect or failed to do something right at Copenhagen? 
According to an official speech of Premier Wen, Chinese delegation has expounded China’s national 
policy of ‘voluntary but determinate emissions reduction’ and made its greatest efforts to promote 
arriving at a global agreement. In this sense, China did nothing wrong at Copenhagen. From another 
speech of him at the press conference after the 2010 session of National People’ Congress (NPC) 
(2010), though, one may conjecture that China might make more comprises at the last moment if it 
had been treated more equally and politely. 
If looking at the opinions among the academics, what we can find is quite divergent. In 
general, except for a few scholars like Prof. Angang Hu (2009a), there are little comments saying that 
China should dramatically reshape its position declared at Copenhagen, though a discernible 
convergence is that more ‘right doings’ on the global stage are both necessary and desirable (Qin 
2010). 
In this context, China’s policy position towards global climate governance in the first years 
after Copenhagen can be generalized as follows. China promises to support the implementation of 
the Copenhagen Accord and to adopt ever-stricter policy measures to realize national targets of 
energy saving and emissions reduction; while there is no consensus regarding whether and how 
China should assume any binding obligation of cutting emissions in the targeted period of 2012-
2020 or thereafter. The point at issue is not the exact year that China should peak its emission but 
when China will determine to join an international system based on the ‘MRV’ (measuring, reporting 
and verification) principles. And, it is in this regard which is problematic for both China and the West: 
The latter is eagerly to realize such an integration but the former very reluctantly to do so. 
Thus, it seemed that the majority of Chinese society needs a much longer time to digest the 
clear message raised in Copenhagen (Huan 2013; Cao 2010; Wong 2010; Zhang S. 2010): Given 
China’s new identities - replacing the US as the largest country of GHG emissions in the world, a 
rising economic and political power and a rapidly industrializing developing country - saying ‘to 
make our own backyard cleaner’ is definitely no longer good enough.  
 
Moving towards a new stage of climate governance participation 
 
From a viewpoint of environmental politics, the ‘Copenhagen heritage’ for China is in double 
sense (Huan 2013; Conrad 2012; Wang J. 2009): China knows better that it can defend its 
conventional interests in a conventional manner, while the country also knows better that it has to 
figure out a new strategy dealing with new (global) politics such as climate change. 
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Thus, one can imagine that, for a short time, China is unlikely to reshape dramatically its 
current international strategy and profile and to be an enthusiastic promoter for a stern system of 
global climate governance, especially in 2012-2020. Over a long run, however, there is a great 
potential for China to re-orient its position in global climate governance.  
Why? Domestically, Chinese governments are facing an ever-stronger pressure to resolve the 
deteriorating environmental problems effectively by improving the coordination of national and 
international policy. Otherwise, local governments might continue to carry out a similar ‘dual 
strategy and tactic’ in implementing national environmental laws and regulations; sacrificing the 
quality of ecological environments in order to maintain economic growth, because they have been 
for a long time believing that economic growth receives first priority. Internationally, confronting 
with a more divergent world, China increasingly realizes that a better way to protect its own 
interests is to maintain or even speed up the on-going negotiations of a post-Kyoto plan as a UN-led 
regime rather than a West-dominated one. 
In retrospective, the above tendency is to a large extent confirmed by the evolution of 
China’s climate policy over the past years. At the domestic level, the Chinese governments start to 
adopt more ambitious policy guidelines against the ever-worsening environmental problems, such 
as fog and haze, though the discourse or strategy of eco-civilization construction is still far from fully 
committed or implemented (Huan et al. 2014 and 2013; Lu 2013). 
At the international level, owing to a weakening pressure from the Western side caused by 
the economic and financial crises, the Chinese government managed to avoid, on the one hand, any 
substantial challenges at COP meetings after Copenhagen (Cancun, Durban, Doha and Warsaw), 
with no binding agreements to be reached or signed. On the other hand, though insisting on 
extending the Kyoto Protocol into its second stage and allocating the major obligations for the 
advanced countries, China - as the leader of the BRICS group3- principally supported establishing 
the Durban Platform, which would eventually lead to a post-2020 targeted global agreement in 2015. 
Thus, there was no surprise to hear on June 3rd 2014, one day after the Obama 
administration’s declaration that the US will introduce a stricter policy restricting emissions from 
coal power production (reducing 30% from 2005 levels by 2030), the Chinese side also disclosed that 
it is considering to set up a timetable for reducing its total amount of emissions during the 13th 
national plan of 2016-2020. 
In June 2015, China announced its policy offer for the coming Paris Summit: peaking its total 
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emissions by 2030 and reducing the emissions per GDP unit in 60%-65% by 2030 (comparing with 
2005 levels). Later, President Jinping Xi attended the 2015 global summit on sustainable 
development at New York and the Paris Summit, showing that China will play a more active role in 
reaching and implementing the Paris Agreement. 
Nevertheless, one should not over-interpret the above progress to say that China is making 
a U-turn in its international negotiation and governance regarding climate change. In my point of 
view, just like the ‘two track system’ of Kyoto Accord, the element most interested China in the Paris 
Agreement is the agreement’s nature of ‘nationally determined contribution’ (Wang 2016). Thus, 
there will still be some obstacles or disputes regarding how to inspect its implementation in the 




The up-to-date development of China’s global climate policy - especially its active 
engagement in reaching and approving the Paris Agreement - is both situational (short-term 
consideration based), not the least to liquidate the negative heritage from the unsuccessful 
Copenhagen conference, and stage-making, to find a positive way to be involved in creating an 
effective system of global climate governance.  
Owing to various reasons, like the three ones outlined at the beginning of this article (its 
total amount of GHG emissions, demonstration effects of the developed countries and the ever-
enhancing national eco-awareness), China is indeed becoming an active player in global climate 
politics, though it is unlikely to accept a role of world-leader in the foreseeable future. In other words, 
China will surely be more and more active, but not unconditional4. Core elements of a China-favored 
global climate governance system include an updated version of ‘common but differentiated 
responsibility’ principle; a UN-led real global regime rather than national - or regional -dominated 
regime; a responsibility sharing and allocation mechanism that fully considers and respects the 
capacity differences among the nations as well as eco-regions, among others. Accordingly, China 
will gradually shift its profile in global climate governance from a moral responsibility-undertaker 
to a political and legal one. Though, in order to be politically and legally ‘responsible’, it is necessary 
and helpful for China to deepen and broaden its moral basis as an internationally responsible actor 
(albite fulfilling the political and legal obligations can be said to be a moral responsibility) (Huan 
                                                              
4 In the long run, China aims to reconstruct both the actual structure and the dominant discourse of global 
climate politics. Therefore, a Chinese version of global climate governance system as well as its world 
leadership is very different from that of today (Huan 2016). 
 
 
                                                 UAS Spring Campus 2016 Conference Proceedings 
 
 
UAS Working Paper 01/2017   11  
2013). 
Undoubtedly, such a policy and cognition adjustments for China will be a complicated and 
time-consuming process. Both the internal ‘pull’ impetus and the external ‘push’ impetus are 
necessary and desirable for a comprehensive shift; though, the greening of domestic politics is 
always a more influential factor and any input from the international side should be reciprocal or 
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Russian climate politics in light of the Paris Conference 
Irina A. Shmeleva1 
Russian science has a long history of addressing climate change starting from the middle of 
the 19th century, especially due to Mikail Budyko and Kirill Kondratiev, the renowned 20th century 
climatologists. In 2003, Alexander Bedritsky, the head of Roshydromet2, was appointed as the head 
of the World Meteorological Organization. Traditionally in Russia there has been a significant 
discussion in the scientific community concerning the role of the natural and anthropogenic causes 
of climate change. On the other hand, the anthropogenic causes of climate change and the role of 
CO2 emissions gained more support during the discussions concerning the Kyoto Protocol 
ratification by Russia in 2004 and were supported by political statements of the Russian Federation 
on Climate change starting from 2008 (Shmeleva & Shmelev, 2012). 
Figure 1. Average surface temperature in Russia, 1936-2014, deviations from the mean of 1961-1990 
(source Roshydromet (2015). Report on the Peculiarities of Climate on the Territory of the Russian 
Federation in 2014, Moscow). 
According to the Russian Climate Assessment Report (Roshydromet 2015), there is a 
tendency for the average surface temperature in Russia to increase (Figure 1). Later on in 2015, the 
data on the average area covered by sea ice in the (Russian) Arctic region based on observations in 
September (that year) was published, that demonstrated the tendency for its rapid decline (Figure 
2) along with the number of dangerous meteorological events increasing.
1 Dr. Irina Shmeleva, Institute of Sustainable Development Strategy (ANO), Saint Petersburg;  
ITMO University, Saint Petersburg; irina_shmeleva@hotmail.com  
2  The Federal Service for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring in the Ministry of Natural 
Resources and Environment. 
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Figure 2. Average surface of sea ice in the Russian Arctic, 1924-2014 (source Roshydromet (2015). 
Report on the Peculiarities of Climate on the Territory of the Russian Federation in 2014, Moscow). 
Along with events mentioned above, significant temperature anomalies in various regions 
of the Russian Federation were observed in 2014: the strongest warming was observed during 
Spring: from +1.76’C in the Caucasus to +4.74 C’ in Central Siberia, compared to the average 
temperatures for 1961-1990. Precipitation levels have been increasing since early 1970s, but the 
occurrence of precipitation anomalies has also been spatially uneven across various regions in 
Russia. The frequency of extreme events in Russia has also grown since 1990s (Roshydromet, 2015). 
There was and still is a lot of uncertainty over the estimation of the future changes in climatic 
variables in the Russian Federation. According to the data, climatic changes are very uneven in 
different regions. For example, for North-West, North of Urals, North and East Siberia and parts of 
Far East, the moderate increases in winter temperature and much smaller summer temperature 
increases were predicted for the period of 2011-2030 (Roshydromet, 2008). For the future periods of 
2041 -2060 much more substantial increases in winter temperatures are predicted in North-West, 
North of the Urals and North Siberia along with summer temperature increases in the Central Volga, 
Southern North-West, Urals and Siberia regions. 
The most climatically-vulnerable regions now are the Arctic regions of Russia, inhabited by 
indigenous people, practicing traditional activities such as reindeer herding, hunting and gathering. 
At the same time, oil and gas companies have a great interest in fossil fuels extraction in these 
regions. Systemic view on the problem and its consequences is needed from the political, economic 
and humanitarian point of view. Along with some economic benefits of climate change in the Arctic 
like opening the Northern Arctic marine route, there will be a lots of dangerous impacts on 
infrastructure. Examples include damage to the roads and settlements located on permafrost soils 
that started to melt; changing vegetation periods and impacts on biodiversity; bacteria emerging 
from melting permafrost soils that could influence on human health. 
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According to the Report on Peculiarities of Climate on the Territory of Russian Federations 
for 2014 (Roshydromet, 2015), the concentration of CO2 reached the maximum of 403.2 ppm in 2014 
and Methane concentrations were going up. All in all, there were 412 dangerous hydro-
meteorological events with damages and loss of life. Forest fires covered 1.3 million hectares of the 
territory of the Russian Federation. The authors of the report articulate that Russian Federation is 
responsible for 5,3% of global CO2 emissions, 75% of which results from energy generation from 
coal, gas and oil. 25 % of the country’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions can be absorbed by forests, 
but forests’ capacity is declining. 
There is still a very low awareness of the climate change problems and actions needed 
among the Russian citizens, including business and municipalities, and a lot of climate sceptics 
among policy makers. But at the same time, at the scientific level, climate change research is of high 
quality and is distributed among research institutes of the Academy of Sciences, Hydro-
meteorological institutes, Arctic and Polar Research Institutes, Universities, Economic Research 
Institute and even the institutions of city planning, such as Saint Petersburg Institute of General Plan. 
The milestones of the Russian Climate Policy 1994-2014 are outlined below. 
• In 1994 a Federal law on the ratification of the united Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) was passed by the Russian Parliament (Gosduma RF 1994); after
ratification of the UNFCCC the Interdepartmental committee of the Russian Federation on
climate change issues was created;
• In 1995 the first National Communication of the Russian Federation to UNFCCC was
submitted;
• In 1996 the Federal Goal Programme “Mitigation of the Dangerous Changes in Climate and
their Negative Consequences” was adopted;
• In 1998 the Second National Communication of the Russian Federation to UNFCCC was
submitted;
• In 2000 the Environmental Doctrine of the Russian federation was adopted (Gosdima RF,
2000);
• In 2003 the Third National Communication to UNFCCC was submitted; the Russian Federal
Service for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring (Roshyydromet) was
appointed as a responsible body of the administration to support the Russian Federation
participation in UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol; the World Climate Change Conference was
held in Moscow;
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• In 2004 the Federal Law on Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol was adopted allowing the
Kyoto Protocol to enter into Force;
• In 2005 the “Strategic Prediction for the period of up to 2010-2015of climate change
expected in Russia and its impact on sectors of the Russian national economy” was
published by Roshydromet (Roshydromet 2005); the first “Report on the Peculiarities of
Climate in the Russian Federation” came out and became an annual publication by
Roshydromet; the Interdepartmental Committee on the problems of implementation of the 
Kyoto Protocol in the Russian Federation was formed;
• In 2006 the Russian system of evaluation of the anthropogenic source emissions and
absorption by the GHG sequesters, not regulated by the Montreal Protocol on the
substances destroying the ozone layer was created; the Russian Registry of the Carbon Units 
was launched; the Fourth National Communication of the Russian Federation to UNFCCC
was submitted;
• In 2008 the ‘Evaluation Report on the Climate Change and its consequences in the Russian
Federation was published;
• In 2009 First legal acts on the implementation of measures on the Kyoto Protocol’s
‘flexibility mechanisms’; ‘Climatic Doctrine of the Russian Federation’ was adopted;
Alexander Bedritsky was appointed councillor of the President of the Russian Federation
and a special representative of the President of the Russian Federation on Climate Issues;
• In 2010 Roshydromet was appointed again as a responsible administrative body for
securing participation of the Russian Federation in UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol; Fifth
National Communication of the Russian Federation to UNFCCC was submitted; Energy
strategy of the Russian Federation was adopted;
• In 2011 the Government of Russian Federation adopts the ‘Complex Plan of Implementation 
of the Climatic Doctrine of the Russian Federation until 2020;
• In 2012 the interdepartmental working group of the Administration of the President of the
Russian Federation on the issues related to climate change and securing sustainable
development was created;
• In 2013 President of the Russian Federation signed a Decree No. 752 On the Reductions in
GHG Emissions;
• In 2014 the Sixth National Communication of the Russian Federation to UNFCCC was
submitted and the Government adopts a Plan of actions to secure a reduction in GHG
emissions to the level of 75% of the 1990 levels by 2020;
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• In 2015 several reports were produced: On Participation of Russian Federation in realization
of the UNFCCC and Report on Peculiarities of Climate on the Territory of Russian
Federations for the year 2014 (Roshydromet 2015).
Concerning the Russia’s Post-Kyoto climate policy, Alexey Kokorin (WWF Russia) and Anna
Korpoo (Fritjof Nansen Institute [FNI]) posed a reasonable question: are all these well designed 
documents are of real action or are they merely a window dressing (Kokorin & Korpoo 2013)?  
According to the Kokorin and Korpoo (2013), Russia considers energy efficiency and 
technological innovation the first priorities in climate policy. In 2014 Russia joined the World Bank 
initiative on ‘carbon price’, which includes: (1) taking into account the future costs of CO2 emissions 
in developing investment projects and business plans; (2) standardized reporting on emissions at 
the level of large enterprises; (3) nationally determined carbon regulation measures, which will lead 
to the increased deployment of low emission technologies (Kokorin 2016). The new version of the 
National Biodiversity Conservation Strategy designed by the Ministry of Natural Resources and the 
Environment of the Russian Federation includes the issues of adaptation by ecosystems to climate 
change.  
According to Kokorin and Korpoo (2014), Russia has two climate policy tasks: 1) 
development of the new economic incentives for CO2 emissions reductions, which will lead to 
tangible co-benefits: air quality improvements and new employment; 2) development of adaptation 
measures in agriculture, forestry, cities, transport infrastructures and nature protection. 
Russia took part in the Paris negotiations in December 2015. At a press conference during 
the COP21 the Minister of the Natural Resources and the Environment of Russia, Sergei Donskoi, 
assured the press that climate challenge is a state priority of Russia, and that Russia is supporting 
the agreement and insists on its legally binding nature. Russian non-government organizations 
were rather sceptical in their assessments of the climatic efforts of the Russian government. It was 
argued that the climatic policy in Russia doesn't exist. The NGOs consider effective climate policy to 
be impossible without the dialogue between civil society and government, which is not taking place 
at the moment. 
The main aspects of the Russian position at the COP21 meeting in Paris could be 
summarized with the following main points: 
• Russia confirmed its intentions to reduce CO2 emissions by 30% of 1990 level to 2030;
• Russian efforts introduced an article on the role of forests in carbon sequestration in the text 
of the Paris agreement;
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• Russia intends to reduce CO2 emissions despite the lack of formal targets in the Paris
agreement;
• Russia intends to prepare a Federal Law on the Ratification of the Paris Agreement;
• Russia intends to develop a Low Carbon Development strategy as a part of its Socio-
Economic Development Strategy;
• Russia intends to adopt a Federal Law on the State Regulation of GHG Emissions;
• Russia intends to develop policy tools for enterprises to regulate their emissions and
stimulate new technologies;
• The strategy will propose a series of measures to stimulate the development of renewable
energy.
Russia signed the Paris Agreement on April 22, 2016. At the national level Russia will have to
develop new reporting standards for large (by 2016) and medium (by 2018) enterprises; the system 
of carbon regulation (by 2018), introduction of the Best Available Technologies (by 2018). Russia also 
aims to develop national and regional adaptation plans. According to the Paris Agreement, by 2020 
Russia will have to design a Low Carbon Development Strategy until 2050. Russia has confirmed in 
Paris that it will be increasing its contributions to UNDP Russia Trust and Green Climate Fund. 
Our research on the climate change discourse in the Russian media in 2004-2008 has shown 
that the major international climate change events were responsible for the local maxima of 
numbers of newspaper publications devoted to climate change (Figure 3). Policy debates were 
focused around five major topics: Assessment of the Environmental Effects of Climate Change, 
Development of the Arctic and Climate Change, Post-Kyoto Negotiations, СО2 Emissions Reductions 
and Adaptations to Climate Change. 
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Figure 3. Policy debates on climate change in Russia in 2008 (source: Shmelev & Shmeleva 2012). 
The major actors mentioned in the media in this context were: Government of Russia, 
Federal Hydrometeorological and Environmental Monitoring Service, World Wildlife Fund 
Russia, European Commission, the United Nations, Federal Forestry Agency, Ministry of 
Economic Development of the Russian Federation, World Bank, The Ministry of the Russian 
Federation for Civil Defence, Emergencies and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disaster, 
Friends of the Earth Europe, United States House of Representatives, and the UK Parliament3. A 
network of climate change actors and policy debate categories based on 2008 data is presented 
in Figure 4. 
3 The network analysis of actors and topics of policy debates in climate change in Russia in 2008 could be seen 
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Figure 4. Climate change actors and policy debate categories in Russian media in 2008 (source: 
Shmeleva & Shmelev 2012). 
Our analysis has shown that the most active organizations in the climate policy debates as 
reflected in the media were the government and scientific institutions, with NGOs and the media 
involved at a lower scale. It should be added that the amount of attention to economic, energy and 
policy issues was much higher than to scientific discussions on climate change. The climatic 
discourse in the Russian media has changed in 2009 due to the fact that journalists started to 
participate actively in the Conferences of Parties. In 2015-2016 the attention was drawn to the Paris 
agreement, its ratification, introduction of carbon regulations, wind and solar investments in Russia 
(USD1.7bln), Russia’s carbon trading record, the assessment of regional governance effectiveness 
by measuring the CO2 intensity of Gross Regional Product and such issue as the opposition to low 
carbon development from the Ministry of Energy (see also word cloud in figure 5).  
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Figure 5: Word cloud base on the article of A. Davydova (2016). 
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Germanys transition towards a high renewable energy share - transferable challenges? 
Dörte Ohlhorst1 
Introduction 
The international responsibility of developed countries for greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation 
is of particular importance. The energy transition in Germany contains clear milestones for climate 
protection, the development of renewable energy, energy efficiency and the nuclear phase out. 
These goals are generally accepted in the country and thus represent a robust guideline for policy 
that goes beyond election periods.  
In the course of the German energy transition towards a high renewable energy share 
(‘Energiewende’) some milestones have already been achieved: One third of the German electricity 
supply comes from renewables (gross electricity generation; see figure 1).  
Figure 1: Germany’s energy mix in 2015 (source: German association of energy and water). 
1 Dr. Dörte Ohlhorst, Environmental Policy Research Centre (FFU), Freie Universität Berlin; ohlhorst@zedat.fu-
berlin.de  
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However, Germany still faces some challenges in the energy field. The following targets 
Germany has set in climate and energy policy: 
• nuclear phase out by 2022
• 80 - 95% reduction of CO2 emissions by 2050 (compared to 1990) 2
• 80 - 95% renewable energy share in gross electricity consumption by 2050 (50% by 2030;
65% by 2040)
• improvement of energy efficiency: reduction of primary energy consumption of 20% by 2020 
and of 50% by 2050 (compared to 2008).
Wind and solar power will be the main pillars of the future renewable electricity supply –
however, technology and society will be shaped in parallel. Effects of governance unfold in the 
interaction of heterogeneous factors and contextual conditions. Transition towards a new socio-
technical system needs innovation - niches and laboratories that allow experimentation with new 
technologies and ideas. It involves co-evolution of several inter-connected sub-systems, the 
interaction of a broad range of societal actors and all levels of governance. 
Germany has been successful in advancing its renewable energy policy in recent decades. 
Only twenty years ago, renewable electricity production was still a small niche in the energy supply 
system, and the exploitation of renewable energy faced considerable technical and financial 
challenges. Today, almost 30% of the German electricity supply is met by renewables. However, 
while this represents a considerable success, the ongoing energy transition continues to face new 
challenges that require not only infrastructure development but also social adaptations and 
political adjustments.  
Some factors and experiences of the German energy transition seem to be of extraordinary 
importance to advance GHG mitigation in the energy sector. They might as well play an important 
role in other countries. The following presents three factors crucial for achieving the desirable 
targets the German energy transition: the role of subnational actors in policy innovation diffusion, 
the role of bottom-up initiatives and the role of co-benefits. 
2 It is important to always keep in view the more demanding target of 95%, because possibly the achievement 
of the international two-degree target can only be secured by achieving this more ambitious aim (SRU 2011, 
chap. 2). Even the 80% target can only be achieved if the power sector's potential for full decarbonisation is 
exploited (Matthes 2012; SRU 2011; Öko-Institut and Fraunhofer ISI 2014). In the other sectors, the potential 
for GHG reduction are lower and the costs are higher (SRU 2013). 
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Diffusion in the multi-level governance system and policy reinforcement 
The scholarly model of multi-level governance distinguishes this form of governance from 
hierarchical state authority and takes into consideration the multi-level integration of political 
structures at national, supranational, and subnational levels (Hooghe & Marks 2003; Benz 2007).  
The German ‘Energiewende’ is incorporated in a system of multiple levels. First, Germany is 
a European Union’s member and its energy policy is closely linked to the targets and directives 
developed at the European level (Vogelpohl et al. 2016). Second, Germany has a significant national 
strategy and regulatory framework for climate protection and renewable energy promotion in place. 
The dynamic development of renewables is, to a large extent, driven by financial incentives set at 
the federal level, and goes along with the influence of market actors. This has been crucial in the 
dynamic development of renewables in Germany in the past 20 years of innovation (Bruns et al. 
2011). Third, the transition process is accompanied by a shift to more decentralization, which leads 
to an increasing importance of sub-national authorities. 
According to Jänicke (2014), multi-level governance in Europe represents a multi-impulse 
system which fosters interactive learning from best practice and provides opportunity structures for 
innovation and rapid diffusion. From his perspective, the interplay of instruments at different levels 
of governance provides the basis of a dynamic multi-level reinforcement. In this multi-level 
governance system, subnational levels of governance play an increasingly important role. Therefore, 
the specific role of subnational levels for reinforcing climate action is to be explored not only in 
Germany but in other countries as well. 
Bottom-up engagement and citizen’s ownership as a prerequisite for transformation 
The German Energiewende was strongly driven from the bottom up. Active communities 
and regions, citizen initiatives, cooperatives and private owners of wind & solar plants (prosumers) 
are important actors who promote the transition process. One phenomenon is the growing segment 
of citizen’s energy (‘Buergerenergie’): Almost half of Germany's installed eco-power in the electricity 
sector is owned by citizens and small private investors (apart from offshore wind) (Ohlhorst 2016b). 
The high private investments strengthen the regional added value of renewables, they remain 
largely in the local economic cycle, rather than run into global financial flows. In addition, municipal 
budgets benefit from tax revenues. Economic and social effects of local investments in renewable 
energy are important especially for rural and structurally weak regions. There is not just a small 
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number of large companies who are benefiting, but we also observe an effect of democratization 
and diversification of actors in electricity production in Germany. A high number of actors can share 
the value added. The influence in the energy market is more broadly diversified – the oligopoly of 
large corporations in the energy market is broken. Last but not least, the costs of energy produced 
by citizens are lower than those produced by large companies, because some costs can be avoided 
through voluntary work.  
The dynamic development of citizen’s energy production in Germany was based on the 
(federal) regulatory framework. The central instrument is the Renewable Energy Act (EEG). It gives 
priority access to the grid and provides differentiated feed-in-tariffs for renewables. Investors in 
renewables receive sufficient compensation to provide a return on investment - irrespective of 
electricity prices. This leads to a high level of investment security. Every three to four years, feed-in 
tariffs are reviewed and the law is amended. A digression of feed-in tariffs brought down the costs 
of renewables. The instrument was copied worldwide.  
However, the last major revision of the EEG in August 2014 provides a shift in the support 
system from the feed-in system to an auction system with quotas (limited expansion – the share of 
renewable energy sources [RES] should not exceed 35 to 40% by 2020). This shift aims at lower costs 
of the energy transition. The instrumental shift to an auction scheme will influence the actor-
constellation in the renewable electricity market: it generates higher transaction costs for investors 
and will diminish the chances for those actors who cannot diversify financial risks. It bears the risk 
that citizen’s energy can no longer participate in the competition.  
Business models in the energy sector are highly dependent on the respective national 
regulatory framework. There are concerns that due to the alteration of the legal framework, the civil 
commitment for and social acceptance of the energy transition will massively decrease in Germany. 
The hypothesis is that the legal framework to promote renewable energy in different countries has 
a strong impact not only on the dynamics of the expansion of renewable energy, but also on 
participation, democratization, acceptance, diversification and resilience of the national energy 
supply system. 
Highlighting co-benefits of greenhouse gas mitigation strengthens renewable energy policy 
If decision makers want to achieve the support of as many actors as possible for a system 
transition, it seems to be of great importance to highlight co-benefits (win-win effects, synergies) of 
the implementation of sustainable technologies and to strengthen synergies. Co-benefits are 
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unintended (not selectively induced) but welcomed positive side effects of a policy action (Maa et 
al. 2013). They are positive secondary effects of a political intervention that come into operation in 
addition to the intended effects. The complementary benefits can indirectly strengthen the 
intended effect or refer to another objective or policy area.  
The high relevance of co-benefits for climate protection policy is stressed by the IPCC (IPCC 
2001, 2007, 2014a, 2014b) and the World Bank (World Bank o.J.). The IPCC refers to climate 
protection policies and their positive side effects on adjacent sectors and focuses on the 
identification, assessment and management of the interactions of climate change policies with 
other social objectives and the targeted strengthening of climate protection measures. It is assumed 
that the tracking of multiple targets strengthens the robustness of policy.  
Also the literature about positive policy feedbacks points out the coupling of co-benefits to 
the intended effect of measures (Jordan & Matt 2014; Jacobs & Weaver 2015). The energy sector is 
identified as the arena with a particular high potential for significant co-benefits (Smith & Haigler 
2008). Co-benefits can emerge through the overlap of policy goals. They can strengthen the 
motivation of states, regions and municipalities to set ambitious targets for the expansion of 
renewable energy generation, they facilitate political feasibility and stability of decisions and 
strengthen positive policy feedback. The IPCC report "Mitigation of Climate Change" (IPCC 2014) 
emphasizes the need for more information on the various co-benefits as well as adverse side-
effects3 and costs that are assigned to alternative policy options. 
The term "co-benefits" is often used in terms of business profits. But co-benefits of energy 
and climate protection policy measures go beyond economic benefits: Political, social and 
institutional co-benefits relate in regards to participation, cooperation and political stability 
(Mayrhofer & Gupta 2016, p.25). The IPCC identifies a number of co-benefits of climate change 
policies, such as clean air impacts – linked with public health impacts, motor for green jobs, 
resilience, water supply, women empowerment, resource efficiency, economic security, 
sustainability of ecosystems, protection of biodiversity, economic dynamism, reduced dependence 
on fossil fuels/energy security (for importing countries), less risks of disruption in power supply and 
lower risk of economic losses caused by price volatility (Friis Bach 2016; Smith & Haigler 2008). Other 
highlighted co-benefits are the democratization of energy production, the optimization of energy 
use and efficiency, the diversification of energy supply and disruption of traditional energy cycles. 
The IPCC also uses the terms "side benefits", "secondary benefits", "collateral benefits", and 
3 The IPCC / UNFCCC and WHO developed - in conjunction with other international organizations - standard 
procedures for the scoping of co-benefits of climate and health measures in the context of development 
projects. Also risk factors with respect to negative effects are considered. 
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"associated benefits" (IPCC, 2001). 
Co-benefits approaches are often referring to developing countries, arguing that co-benefit-
based actions have the potential to bridge the gap between necessary climate mitigation efforts 
and the need to boost economic growth and poverty eradication, that they can help advance 
climate policies in developing countries due to their potential for economically beneficial climate 
mitigation actions, and thus can provide for both development and climate mitigation (Dubash 2013; 
Dubash et al. 2013; Beermann et al. 2016).  
Essentially three meanings of the term should be distinguished (Miyatsuka & Zusman (o.J.): 
• "Development co-benefits": this is about (local) additional benefits of climate protection
measures (e.g. air quality improvement, jobs, substitution of old coal-fired power plants,
resilience, self-sufficiency) (intended or non-intended). This definition corresponds to the
emphasis of the IPCC.
• "Climate-added value": additional benefits of development plans or sectoral policies. This
perspective was developed in light of the assumption that developing countries would
always put a greater emphasis on (economic) development than on climate change.
• Co-benefits of GHG mitigation at the individual level: A lifestyle focusing on sufficiency is not 
only relevant for climate protection goals and energy savings, but also associated to many
advantages for consumers, e.g. to time affluence, leisure, enjoyment, health, life
satisfaction, comfort, self-determination, mindfulness, resonance, self-esteem and esteem
of others, of things and of the environment, social justice (by not consuming goods and
services) and possibly also to an increase in jobs. Moreover, stronger local and regional
bond and rooting is part of the sufficiency approach.
This paper argues that co-benefits strengthen climate policies not only in developing
countries but in developed countries as well. In practice, co-benefits are particularly relevant when 
social and technical innovations are required for the solution of multidimensional crises. In complex 
conflict situation the ability to draw attention and support by a broad range of different 
stakeholders is becoming a key factor for policy choice. Political decisions with the aim to transform 
the energy supply system are easier to enforce if they are supported by many interests. The here 
presented hypothesis says that by highlighting co-benefits, a wider support of stakeholders can be 
achieved for climate protection policies in both developing and industrialized countries.  
The question to be explored is under which conditions co-benefits are suitable to reinforce 
the intended policy effects – do co-benefits only have this effect if they are sufficiently strong, if the 
respective actor coalition is sufficiently strong, if unintended negative effects are controllable and if 
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benefits occur at different political levels? 
Conclusions 
This paper aimed at highlighting the relevance of three factors for successful energy 
transition processes: the role of subnational actors for diffusion of innovative policies and policy 
reinforcement in the multi-level governance system; the role of bottom-up engagement and 
citizen’s ownership as a prerequisite for transformation and the role of co-benefits for strengthening 
energy transition processes. The relevance of these factors for energy system transition will be 
explored in a research project. 
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Decentralised laboratories in the German energy transition: Empirical evidence from the 
district of Ahrweiler1 
Jan Beermann², Kerstin Tews2 
Need for laboratories of innovation in low carbon energy transitions 
An energy transition is a complex process of sociotechnical change, which requires 
destabilising lock-in mechanisms in the existing system, shifts in behavioural patterns of consumers 
and producers, as well as technological, political, and social innovation (Geels 2010). The scale of 
an unprecedented transformation such as the German energy transition means that setting up a 
predefined and all-encompassing “master plan” is neither meaningful nor feasible. Rather, the 
uncertainties associated with fundamental societal transitions require freedom for constant 
experimentation and innovation, to explore and test new approaches and to allow for adjustment 
to dynamic socio-political framework conditions and technological progress (Rotmans et al. 2001). 
In this paper, we elaborate on the role and potential of decentralised experiments in the German 
energy transition process.  
The role of decentralised laboratories in multi-level governance systems 
The role of decentralised initiatives and their capacity to innovate has been increasingly 
discussed in energy and climate governance research. Laboratory federalism theory suggests that 
decentralised jurisdictions can function as “laboratories of innovations” (Oates 1999; Saam and 
Kerber 2013). Under certain conditions, these innovations can subsequently disseminate, triggered 
by horizontal processes of policy learning and diverse diffusion mechanisms such as regulatory or 
ideational competition (Kern 2000; Tews et al. 2003; Tews 2005). Literature on policy diffusion 
pronounces that such bottom-up and decentralised innovation diffusion processes can be 
perceived as an alternative or complementary mechanism of convergence to hierarchical and 
(inter)national state-centred negotiation (Busch et al. 2005; Tews 2015). 
1 An extended and updated version of this article has been published in the Journal of Cleaner Production:  
Beermann, Jan; Tews, Kerstin (2016): Decentralised laboratories in the German energy transition. Why local 
renewable energy initiatives must reinvent themselves. In: Journal of Cleaner Production. DOI: 
10.1016/j.jclepro.2016.08.130. Download: 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S095965261631294X 
2 Dr. Jan Beermann, Dr. Kerstin Tews, Environmental Policy Research Centre (FFU), Freie Universität Berlin; 
jbeermann@fu-berlin.de, ktews@zedat.fu-berlin.de  
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Scholars of polycentric governance (e.g. Ostrom 2010) investigate the diverse roles and 
particularly the interplay between the distinct levels in multi-level/-actor governance systems. A key 
research area of polycentric governance is exploring the challenges of cross-jurisdictional 
governance of common pool environmental resources, such as the climate system (e.g. Andersson 
and Ostrom 2008; Jordan et al. 2015). There is a widespread assumption and a positive narrative 
offered by scholars of polycentric governance that the decentralised, sub-national level provides an 
adequate space to experiment with innovations (Jordan et al. 2015). Nevertheless, literature on sub-
national experimentation generally has a tendency to show over-enthusiasm for the innovation 
potential of decentral and bottom-up processes (ibid.) and fails to address scaling-up needs.  
Research needs: Backing up the positive narrative with empirical evidence 
There is a solid basis in empirical reality of decentral experimentation in energy transitions 
(e.g. 100% Renewable energy regions, transnational energy cities’ collaboration, etc.). In Germany, 
there also exist diverse governmental climate protection programs at the federal level with a specific 
municipal or regional focus, with the explicit intention to:  
a) stimulate the translation of global climate challenges and/or energy transition challenges
into local experimentation (scaling down) in order to;
b) develop model solutions for others (scaling up).
Although this approach reflects the potential of decentral laboratories of innovations in polycentric 
governance systems, there is a lack of substantial evaluation of these efforts in order to draw policy 
lessons, for example in identifying and designing scalable innovations and for planning adequate 
scale-up-programs (Spicer et al. 2015; MSI 2012).  
Without providing an empirical evidence of the decentralised level’s real contribution to the 
management of systemic challenges of energy transformations and global climate change 
mitigation, we cannot verify the decentralised level’s role in polycentric governance systems. Thus, 
we have to re-shift the research focus to investigate the conditions and mechanisms associated with 
scaling up/innovation diffusion. In other words, we need more empirically informed research in 
order to:  
1. evaluate efforts at the decentralised level with regard to:
 governance challenges of systemic relevance that can be addressed at this level. These
governance challenges cannot be restricted to those specific challenges relevant for a
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specific decentral jurisdiction but instead for the energy transition processes in general 
and/or global climate change mitigation, and related to that;  
 the degree of transferability of decentral innovations and scaling-up mechanisms.
2. clearly assess the interplay between the policy levels and the different modes of policy
coordination in polycentric governance systems.
Against the backdrop of these theoretical considerations the “real-world laboratory” 
(Reallabor) project of Ahrweiler, Germany (EnAHRgie) is of specific interest, as within this 
“decentralised experiment” several of the challenges described above are addressed by an inter- 
and transdisciplinary project team of eight research institutes and multiple local stakeholders.  
Project EnAHRgie: sustainable land use and energy supply at the local level in the model region of 
Ahrweiler (2015-2019) 
The task of the applied research project EnAHRgie3 is to develop an energy concept for the 
transformation of Ahrweiler4 into a 100% Renewable Energy (RE) Region. The tools of this concept 
are to be designed to be applicable not only to Ahrweiler but also to other regions in Germany. 
Ahrweiler challenges the positive narrative of decentral initiatives, such as the 100% RE 
regions movement, as the nuclei of the German energy transition outlined above. It was deliberately 
selected as a so-called “deficient” case with regard to its difficult social, political and geographical 
conditions for a local energy transition. Four years after having introduced the ambitious target of 
100% electricity from renewable energy sources (RES) on an annual basis by 2030 in 2011, Ahrweiler 
produced about 12% RES electricity in 2015, mainly from wind and solar energy (Kreis Ahrweiler, 
2015, p.5).   
This paper presents three governance challenges that decentralised initiatives, such as 
Ahrweiler, face in pursuing a local energy transition.  
Governance challenge I: Mismatch between issue areas and territorial borders 
The first governance challenge is a challenge typical for regional governance approaches: 
3 The inter- and transdisciplinary project EnAHRgie is funded by the Germany Federal Ministry for Education 
and Research (BMBF) as part of the Research for Sustainable Development framework FONA 
(http://www.fona.de/en/framework). For more information about the EnAHRgie project and the partners 
involved please visit the project’s website:  http://enahrgie.de/ (in German). 
4 Ahrweiler is a largely rural county (“Landkreis”, the jurisdiction above the municipal level) in the Western 
German state of Rhineland-Palatinate, consisting of 74 municipalities and about 126,000 inhabitants (2013). 
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issue areas and territorial borders often do not fit (e.g. Fürst 2004). This is exemplified in Ahrweiler. 
The decision to pursue 100% RES electricity was taken by the county parliament. Many problems as 
well as potential solutions, however, go beyond the territorial borders and the formal political and 
administrative influence of the county and demonstrate that the county is not a sufficient spatial 
focus for a regional energy concept. One example is land use and distributional conflicts arising from 
renewable energy plants with a wider spatial impact, such as wind turbines. In Ahrweiler, many of 
the existing and planned wind turbines are located close to the county’s border and have a visual 
and natural impact on neighbouring municipalities and counties. A second example is the 
heterogeneous regional identities and interests in Ahrweiler. The county-wide perception of shared 
identity and solidarity is relatively weak among the local population. Most inhabitants consider 
themselves as belonging to smaller regions that have historically developed according to the 
utilisation of the diverse habitats within and beyond the county borders (e.g. touristic Rhine valley, 
wine-growing Ahr valley, agricultural Grafschaft and forested Eifel). A third example is the fact, that 
due to nature conservation and other legal and political restrictions, it will be impossible (or very 
expensive) to realise 100% renewable production in Ahrweiler. For the county’s long-term target of 
achieving regional energy independence, Ahrweiler therefore needs to coordinate and exchange 
fluctuating renewable energy with neighbouring regions that have fewer restrictions.   
Governance challenge II: Complex multi-level interplay of spatial planning and other decision-
making competencies 
A second governance challenge that decentralised energy transition initiatives are 
confronted with is the distribution of spatial planning and other decision-making competencies 
beyond several political-administrative levels. In Rhineland-Palatinate, the German subnational 
state where Ahrweiler is located, a total of five jurisdictional levels are involved in the planning and 
steering of renewable energies: two levels of municipalities (Orts- and Verbandsgemeinden), the 
counties, planning regions and the state of Rhineland-Palatinate. The state determines RES 
expansion targets and principles which are operationalised by the planning regions into regional 
spatial development plans. The municipalities specify priority and excluded areas for the building 
of RES plants. The counties have no formal planning and decision-making competencies. They 
function as approval authorities surveying the compliance of legal requirements in RES projects. 
This distribution of competencies beyond multiple political-administrative levels requires 
extensive coordination and cooperation. The implementation of the local energy transition in 
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Ahrweiler demonstrates, however, that coordination is often lacking and formal coordination 
mechanisms are insufficient in allowing for coherent and efficient planning and RES project 
implementation. Examples of this lack of coordination include the delayed implementation of 
updated targets and principles of the state into the regional spatial development plans, leading to 
legal insecurity for the county of Ahrweiler as the approval authority.  
Also the coordination between the two levels of municipality, the Ortsgemeinden and 
Verbandsgemeinden, is often difficult, especially if they pursue different interests.  The lower level 
municipalities, the Ortsgemeinden, have constitutionally guaranteed decision-making 
competencies of municipal self-rule. They are run by mayors and local councils on an honorary basis 
and can encompass less than 100 inhabitants. The Verbandsgemeinden, which are federations of 
several Ortsgemeinden, support the Ortsgemeinden administratively. The Verbandsgemeinden can 
also decide about priority and exclusion areas for RES plants by setting up land use plans. The 
county of Ahrweiler consists of a total of 70 Ortsgemeinden, four Verbandsgemeinden, plus four 
independent cities and municipalities which have conducted RES planning in a largely 
uncoordinated and fragmented manner. In expert interviews, local stakeholders assess the 
integration of and the coordination between the municipalities and cities as a key challenge for 
realising a county-wide energy concept.  
We suggest that two strategies should be applied in order to set up and implement an 
energy concept in inter-municipal cooperation. 
Firstly, due to the deficiencies of existing formal coordination mechanisms between the five 
political-administrative levels involved there is a need to extend informal coordination. Several less 
formalised inter-municipal platforms already exist. A promising example is a cross-county and 
cross-state organised working group for development, planning and transport called “Regionaler 
Arbeitskreis Entwicklung, Planung und Verkehr Bonn/Rhein-Sieg/Ahrweiler” (abbreviation: “:rak”). 
According to an interviewee from the Ahrweiler county administration, Ahrweiler utilises the :rak 
regularly for the informal exchange of know-how and good practises in local RES planning with 
other counties and municipalities. The :rak illustrates that it can be helpful or even necessary for 
effective regional governance approaches to develop new problem or issue-specific spatial 
dimensions that may not be based on traditional territorial borders. For the design of an inter-
municipal cooperation towards a local energy transition in Ahrweiler it should be considered 
whether it is possible to make use of platforms such as the :rak as they may be able to complement 
the existing formal coordination mechanisms and potentially compensate for their deficiencies.    
    UAS Spring Campus 2016 Conference Proceedings 
UAS Working Paper 01/2017 36  
Secondly, the county needs to strengthen its role as an informal inter-municipal mediator 
and moderator. Having no formal planning authority and very limited decision-making 
competencies in energy or energy-related policy fields the county needs to convince the 
municipalities to coordinate their planning activities voluntarily on a subordinate policy level. The 
fact that the county is the approval authority for local RES plants may facilitate its mediation and 
moderation role, as the county gathers a lot of information about existing and planned RES 
activities in its jurisdiction.  
Governance challenge III: Adaptation to changing political framework conditions at superior policy 
levels 
Decentralised energy transition initiatives, such as the county of Ahrweiler’s energy concept, 
are highly dependent on the national and European regulatory and support frameworks (Tews 2015; 
Beermann and Tews 2015). Klagge et al. (2013) point to a duality of economic incentives at the 
national level versus the spatial planning competencies at the regional and local level and they 
criticise the fact that a lack of coordination between the political-administrative entities in the 
German federal political system prevented a resource-efficient, ecological and just expansion of RES. 
Data collected in Ahrweiler confirms that local stakeholders, such as the county 
administration, energy utilities, energy cooperatives and RES project planners consider the dynamic 
changes and increasing complexity of the political and legal framework conditions as a major barrier 
to the implementation of decentralised energy transition projects. Several key laws are undergoing 
major reforms, leading to a perception of a generally instable and insecure investment climate for 
RES projects by decentralised actors. In particular, the introduction of annual RES extensions caps 
and a volume-based auction system in the renewable energy support scheme (Erneuerbare 
Energien Gesetz - EEG), as well as the increasing requirements for flexible demand and supply 
management in the Energy Industry Act (Energiewirtschaftsgesetz - EnWG) force decentralised 
actors to re-evaluate and re-invent their business models. A mere focus on adding RES capacity 
without addressing system demands is not feasible any more. Decentralised actors such as local 
and citizen-oriented RES initiatives with limited financial and human resources struggle with the 
increasing risks and transaction costs imposed by the changing framework conditions. In particular, 
the introduction of auction schemes for RES is considered as an existential threat by many small-
scale, decentralised RES initiatives (Tews 2015; Beermann and Tews 2015).  
We suggest that Ahrweiler’s energy concept should be closely tailored to the changing legal 
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and political framework conditions. It should incentivise the development of innovative 
decentralised business models that can be implemented in a profitable manner under the new 
regulation and support schemes for RES. For example, with regard to the new auction scheme in the 
EEG there should be an evaluation of which opportunities remain for decentralised actors to 
successfully bid in auctions, for example by establishing new, collaborative networks of 
municipalities, local project planners and energy cooperatives that jointly prepare and hand in bids. 
If Ahrweiler succeeds in promoting such innovative business models that successfully address the 
changing framework conditions, these models could reach high external visibility and stimulate 
lesson drawing and their transfer to other regions.  
Decentralised energy transition initiatives generally need to shift their previously largely 
inward-looking focus on merely adding local RES capacity to the grid towards a more system-based 
perspective (Ohlhorst and Tews 2013). If decentralised initiatives want to maintain a crucial role in 
the future energy system, they need to start experimenting with feasible models for a regional 
organisation of energy flows by addressing sector coupling of electricity, heating and transport, 
demand-and-supply management and regional marketing models.  
Conclusions 
We suggest the following three conclusions for further discussion in the EnAHRgie research 
project:  
1. Decentralised initiatives such as the 100% RE Region Ahrweiler need to foster vertical and
horizontal integration of decentralised RES deployment to provide systemic solutions and
strengthen systemic impact. They need to take a broader perspective beyond the individual
region to address regional coordination of energy flows and start experimenting with system
integration of decentralised RE deployment.
2. Considering the deficiencies of formalised mechanisms of multi-level governance coordination, 
there is also a need to strengthen informal coordination, within and potentially also beyond
formal political administrative borders.
3. Furthermore, decentralised energy transition initiatives need to extend lesson-drawing
between decentralised experiments to foster diffusion of good practice. The research project
EnAHRgie should therefore address the following questions:
i. What can Ahrweiler learn from other model regions dealing with similar governance
challenges?
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ii. How can the energy concept be designed so that its tools and measures can be
transferred to other regions?
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A concept of sustainable development has been challenged by resilience one, the latter is 
strongly related to a need to consider the climate change in urban and regional development. 
Indeed, goals of sustainable and resilient development can be conflicting; a challenge of adapting 
urban infrastructure to climate change can be a good example. While there is a strong need to 
upgrade existing urban structures and infrastructure to more extreme weather conditions, making 
urban areas more resilient and safe, there is also a need to do it in a sustainable way. Some of the 
tradeoffs include: 1) speed versus sustainability of adaptation, 2) safety and reliability versus 
sustainability and; 3) current needs versus needs of the future generations. In simple terms, 
sustainable is everything that is light, frugal in resources and energy use, as well as land and space 
use. Resilience, on the other hand, implies heavy, reliable, solid structures and even a backup 
infrastructure which could be redundant. This conceptual conflict spreads through physical, as well 
as social systems, covering governance and management issues of development. The climate 
change issue exemplifies that conflict: to mitigate climate change urban communities need to be 
sustainable and to adapt to it they need to be resilient. However, in spite of obvious difference in 
concepts, there can be potential synergies in sustainability and resilience actions, which this 
research has been aiming to explore. This paper reports ongoing work and recent findings on this 
subject, aiming to discuss validity of the research questions and set up agenda and multidisciplinary 
partnerships for the future research. 
Concepts, Definitions, a Research Question 
Sustainable development is that which ‘meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ (Brundtland report, 1987). 
Resilience from a physical and natural sciences perspective implies the ‘capacity of a system 
to absorb, disturbance and reorganize while undergoing change to still retain essentially the same 
1  Dr. Nikolai Bobylev, Head of Chair Environmental Safety and Sustainable Development of Regions, 
Saint Petersburg State University; n.bobylev@spbu.ru    
    UAS Spring Campus 2016 Conference Proceedings 
UAS Working Paper 01/2017 40  
function, structure, identity, and feedbacks’ (Walker et al. 2004, p.1). This is translated into the two 
essential categories: ‘bounce-back-ability’ and adaptability (DeVerteuil & Golubchikov, 2016). 
Adaptation pertains to the process of decision-making and actions carried out to regulate a 
system to future shocks, stresses, or additional varying circumstances in a way that preserves 
critical system functioning (Nelson et al., 2007).  
Figure 1. Conceptual definition of resilience – performance response functions (Sterling and Nelson, 
2013). 
A concept of a liveable cities, which includes aspects of 1) wellbeing, 2) resource security 
(i.e. ‘one planet’ living) and 3) carbon reduction (Hunt et al. 2016). When considering how a city 
might be engineered to maximize liveability options, an understanding of ‘change’ needs to be 
explored (Hunt et al. 2016). In essence this change could either be adaptive or transformative (Table 
1). Table 2 considers conceptual differences between resilience and sustainability. 
Table 1. Contrasting elements of adaptation and transformation (Redman, 2014). 
Adaptive Transformative 
Incremental change Major, potentially fundamental, change 
Respond to shock Action in anticipation of major stresses 
Maintain previous order Create new order, open ended 
Build adaptive capacity Reorder system dynamics 
Emergent properties guide trajectory Build agency, leadership, change agents 
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Table 2. Contrasting elements of resilience and sustainability (Redman, 2014). 
Resilience theory approach Sustainability science approach 
Change is normal, multiple stable states Envision the future, act to make it happen 
Experience adaptive cycle gracefully Utilize transition management approach 
Origin in ecology, maintain ecosystem services Origin in social sciences, society is flawed 
Result of change is open needed, emergent Desired results of change are specified in 
advance 
Concerned with maintaining system dynamics Focus is on interventions that lead to 
sustainability 
Stakeholder input focused on desirable system 
dynamics 
Stakeholder input focused on desirable 
outcomes 
Table 3. Sustainability and resilience goals (Bobylev, 2016 based on Redman, 2014). 
Resilience theory approach Sustainability science approach 
Differences 
Safe, reliable, available now Minimal consumption, the future goal 
Concrete actions to get concrete results Doing the right things 
Utilitarianism to resolve immediate problems A way of life, a religion (?) 
Similarities 
Long term resilience? Short term (practical) sustainability 
Research challenge 
Resilience actions can help or not help future 
sustainability  
Sustainability actions help future 
resilience  
Global Environmental Change are processes that manifest in localities, but with causes and 
consequences at multiple spatial, temporal and socio-political scales (Adger et al, 2005). Land use 
and land cover change are among major factors of contemporary Global Environmental Change 
(GEC). Among other GEC factors are ecosystem changes and loss of biodiversity, climate change, 
and urbanization. 
Governance is an umbrella term to aggregate systems of formal and informal rules, rule-
making systems, actor-networks, including government, industry, and civil society. Governance 
implies that there is no one actor, or institution (e.g. government) that solely influences decision-
making in a specific domain, such as in urban development. Governance concept has been studied, 
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for instance, by Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden (2004) and Adger and Jordan (2008). Governance 
denotes new forms of regulation that go beyond traditional hierarchical state activity (Biermann et 
al, 2010). Governance concept has been eminent in addressing and conceptualizing GEC; Ostrom et 
al (1999) have considered its social and institutional dimensions. 
A case of Urban Physical Infrastructure 
By infrastructure we mean a set of objects or arrangements that, together, carry out specific 
functions and provide services (Bobylev & Jefferson, 2014). Infrastructure includes physical and 
institutional components. For example, flood protection infrastructure would include water barriers, 
drainage conduits, retainer walls, embankments and other structures as physical infrastructure, and; 
monitoring, emergency response, public information, contingent plans as institutional 
infrastructure components (Bobylev, 2013).  
Urban Physical Infrastructure (UPI) can be defined as a set of artificial structures, 
interconnected physically or functionally (Bobylev, 2011). UPI includes physical objects like roads, 
bridges, sewerage, flood protection schemes, energy networks. Particular physical objects can be 
parts of several types of infrastructure, for instance, pumping stations can be a part of sewerage, 
flood management, and electricity infrastructure. UPI is one of the major assets of a city in terms of 
capital investment, critical services provisioning, and sustainable and resilient urban development. 
Globally, UPI is facing increasing challenges in sustaining its services under pressures of 
urbanization and climate change factors; yet UPI itself can be used as an effective policy tool to 
govern urban expansion and wider land use (Bobylev & Jefferson, 2014). Thus, UPI exemplifies the 
above described resilience and sustainability conceptual differences, which translate into a need to 
optimal urban development policies, including UPI development. The influence of different types 
of infrastructure has been increasingly going beyond their core functions, which suggests that a 
broader array of stakeholders should be involved in making decisions on infrastructure 
development policies - a task that fits well into a Governance concept. 
Adaptation versus Mitigation and Resilience versus Sustainability 
Flooding and especially urban flooding has been a matter of serious and accelerating 
concern in the last decades. Here are several facts that are applicable to a vast majority of flooding 
cases: 1) risk of floods increases as GEC advances, 2) floods result from construction activities and 
land use which was unsuitable for given affected locations, 3) combating flooding requires  a whole 
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array of physical infrastructure and institutional measures, and; 4) any flood mitigation options 
require significant investments. A traditional response to flooding has been to construct flood 
defenses, as it has been done in the metropolitan Tokyo area by constructing G-Cans – one of the 
world’s most spectacular and expensive UPI solutions (G-Cans, 2003) (Picture 2).  
However, it is quite clear that such expensive UPI solutions cannot be implemented in all 
areas that could benefit from them. These huge construction and operational expenses translate 
into un-sustainability at a several levels: 1) capital costs, which would be a heavy burden on most 
cites’ or even countries’ budgets, 2) construction materials used, mostly concrete, are quite energy 
intensive to produce, thus facilitating climate change by emitting carbon dioxide, 3) the whole 
construction process, which for such a vast infrastructure requires a lot of land, including excavated 
materials management (temporary storage, landfill), and 4) finally, operation process that require 
electricity for pumps. This example of urban flash floods management infrastructure exemplifies a 
conflict between resilience and sustainability – while surface runoff would occur naturally on 
undeveloped land, its artificial management continuously requires significant resources, including 
energy, which is in conflict with climate change mitigation agenda. 
Figure 2. Critical infrastructure: G-Cans, Tokyo is an underground infrastructure for prevention of 
flooding during rainy season (Source: G-Cans project, Tokyo [http://www.g-cans.jp/]). 
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G-Cans, and similar projects (mainly across Asia, where heavy rainfalls commonly occur), exemplify
challenges of urban policies directed at climate change adaptation, mitigation and the challenge of
meeting resilience and sustainability needs. Leaving for the moment conceptual differences
unresolved, several practical considerations can be made: 1) adapting to floods requires changes in 
land use, which is a complex task and can be elaborated through the governance processes; 2) UPI
solutions would be one of the component, along with policy and land use change measures; 3) UPI
has to be implemented in advance of land development (or redevelopment). Such proactive UPI
might include artificial floodplains, dykes and canals, land or water lots for flood resilient houses
(e.g. floating, semi-floating). Planning, policy, and UPI solutions on the ground should represent a
cohesive strategy, since the whole UPI (utilities, roads, bridges etc.) needs to be designed according 
to chosen solutions for individual housing and transportation options. These approaches are in
coordination with sustainability agenda and can meet resilience needs; however, a question of pace 
of adaptation to climate change remains open, since most of above described solutions are long
term ones.
An important observation of urban flooding analysis is that reactive UPI development can 
hardly be a long term success. Unsustainable land use is the major floods driver in the first place, 
and any infrastructure solutions can just temporarily alleviate the problem, given that GEC pushing 
beyond the limits previously thought for flood defenses. Avoiding urban development in flood prone 
areas is not an option for many regions because there is simply no other space. Hence UPI proactive 
solutions, where land use is led by planned infrastructure, seems to be an adequate policy option 
(Bobylev & Jefferson, 2014). 
Being vulnerable to climate change impacts (Bobylev, 2013), UPI in its turn can help cities to 
adapt to climate change in many ways: from traditional civil defense and emergency response 
facilities to advanced infrastructures for floods (e.g. above mentioned G-Cans project) and urban 
heat island management.  
On a global scale, many large cities which have significant infrastructure assets are located 
in the coastal, low-lying areas most vulnerable to climate change impacts. Coastal areas generate 
about 6% of World’s Gross Domestic Product on about 1% of the area (Dasgupta et al, 2007). Taking 
into account manifestations of climate change like sea level rise and increasing occurrence of 
extreme weather events (IPCC, 2007), it is important to address increasing risks to UPI and reliable 
provisioning of its services.  
In a changing external environment, UPI can be an asset as well as a liability to a city facing 
climate change impacts. UPI can provide opportunities to mitigate and adapt urban areas to climate 
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change, however UPI itself often need to be adapted to climate change risks, both situations require 
significant investments (Bobylev, 2009b). Many UPI networks represent critical infrastructure, which 
means that functioning of a city as a whole directly depend on uninterrupted provisioning of UPI 
services. Therefore, UPI adaptation toGEC, in terms of opportunities to a city that it would provide 
on one hand, and its vulnerability on the other hand, is important in consideration of urban 
resilience (Bobylev & Jefferson, 2014). 
Urban Physical Infrastructure and Governance 
The importance of UPI, as one of the major assets, can and should be reflected in land use 
planning, urban planning, master plans and broader policies, including sustainability policies. 
Approaches developed in the Governance concept can be helpful to highlight UPI as one of the 
factors that is shaping cities physically, economically, socially, and environmentally. Bobylev and 
Jefferson (2014) distinguished two types of UPI interacting with a city (figure 3). 
Figure 3. A concept of reactive and proactive interaction of Urban Physical Infrastructure and a city 
(Bobylev & Jefferson, 2014). 
Reactive type of UPI interaction with a city characterizes UPI which was developed as a 
response to city needs. Examples are: building a new road junction to ease traffic congestion, create 
a river barrier to prevent flooding, building underground public rail system (metro) to respond to 
citizens’ travel needs (Bobylev & Jefferson, 2014). 
Proactive type of UPI interaction with a city represents the opposite concept where UPI is 
constructed having in mind facilitation certain development which might not be physically in palace 
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yet (Bobylev & Jefferson, 2014). Examples are: construction of a new road facilitated business on 
adjacent land lots, public transport infrastructure installed in areas planned for development, flood 
management infrastructure that has been constructed and land lots for housing that has been 
planned according to river management requirements (e.g. room for the river program which is 
under implementation in the Netherlands; see Corvers, 2009, Bobylev, 2010). 
Whereas in reactive interaction type UPI follows urban development, in proactive urban 
development follows UPI. Whereas reactive interaction assumes UPI as a response to already 
existing urban problems, proactive UPI development assumes response to anticipated problems, or 
avoiding certain problems altogether by steering urban development. Thus, proactive UPI 
development makes UPI a component of urban policy, a tool with which development can be 
steered and policies implemented (Bobylev & Jefferson, 2014).  
Central part of a city of Berlin, Germany is an interesting and maybe unique example of how 
UPI was leading urban development. Hobrecht (1862, as reported by Aust & Stark, 1987) created a 
Berlin Master Plan, which was based on sewerage plan (figure 4). Street network was developed 
based on sewers and land lots were available with sewers already in place. This idea was quite new 
at the time, and reflected new technology and demand for improved services. 
Figure 4. City of Berlin Development Plan by Hobrecht, 1862, featuring sewer network 
corresponding with planned street network and land lots for development (Aust and Stark 1987). 
Proactive UPI development can positively contribute towards addressing climate change 
challenges, however it is obvious that most UPI climate change actions would be reactive, that is we 
are willing to adapt existing and planned UPI to climate change impacts. Ample climate change 
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mitigation opportunities exist by developing sustainable UPI (energy efficient, compact, 
encouraging environmentally friendly lifestyles). Wende et al (2010) describes opportunities for 
climate change mitigation and adaptation using a variety of compact urban structures, which are a 
part of UPI, including tree screens, buildings, and artificial landscapes. UPI has its share of influence 
on land-use practices. Urban sprawl is perhaps the second largest factor in sustained land cover 
change after agriculture. In many growing and developing regions we can observe a sequence of 
land occupied by natural ecosystems that has been converted into agricultural land, and then to 
urban land. UPI plays a significant role in urbanization, and poor or absent UPI would correlate with 
low density built sprawling urbanized areas, while advanced UPI correlates with high density build 
urban areas (Bobylev & Jefferson, 2014). UPI arrangement plays an important role in the spatial 
structure of an urban area, its densities and energy use. Thus UPI ought to be an important issue to 
consider in urbanization process, cities’ spatial structure, sustainable land use, and, on a global 
scale, GRC research (Bobylev & Jefferson, 2014). 
Sustainability and resilience goals in urban development 
Table 4 summarizes the above discourse on conflicts and synergies in resilience and 
sustainability, expanding the considerations beyond UPI and extrapolating the considered 
approached to urban development in general. 




Resilience Synergy or conflict; 








Moderate conflict Frugal resource use, 






Wide, ample space for 
each infrastructure 
element to avoid 
Strong conflict Tight, aimed at saving 
space, energy, and 
materials 
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disturbance in case of 
the other failure 
Housing Safe, adapted to 
withstand disasters 
Moderate conflict Liveable and energy 
efficient 
Public spaces Designed to have 
additional capacity for 
disaster response and 
reduction 
Moderate conflict Designed to encourage 
sustainable lifestyles 
Transport Reliable transport 
links, designed to 
withstand variety of 
stresses while
maintaining services 





Ample, to adsorb 
disaster shocks and 
provide refuge 
Strong synergy Ample, to provide 
quality of life 
Optimal urban form Polycentric, to diversify 
risks 
Moderate synergy Compact, to save energy 




Optimal, not too low to 
be able to organize 
common protection 
(flood management) 
and not too high to 
enable disaster 




Optimal, not too low to 
save land and energy 
and not too high to 
enable quality of life  
Climate change Increase industrial 
activities to be able to 
adapt  
Strong conflict Decrease industrial 
activities to reduce 
greenhouse gas 
emissions (mitigate) 
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Conclusions 
Sustainability and resilience approaches to urban development appeared to be (broadly 
speaking) conflicting in a short-term perspective and complimentary on a long term one. Urban 
adaptation to Global Environmental Change will require a complex, comprehensive approach that 
would include significant changes in land use, UPI, and an inevitable shift towards more sustainable 
lifestyles while reexamining an array of natural resources use (Bobylev & Jefferson, 2014). Proactive 
UPI planning and development could significantly contribute towards synergetic approaches 
towards urban sustainability and resilience policy agendas. 
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Governing the energy transition in Berlin: taking the lead in mitigating climate change? 
Gloria Amoruso1 
Framing the problem: cities and climate change and the notion of leadership 
Cities and climate change 
Cities are responsible for nearly 70% of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions (GHG). 
Due to urbanisation it is estimated that this percentage will grow in the coming decades. (UN 
DESA 2011; UN Habitat 2011; Reusswig et al. 2014, p.4) Their importance for climate change is 
also linked to the municipalities’ legislative power over some of the most important sectors 
and infrastructures that are responsible for the emissions. (Bulkeley 2013, p.106) Therefore, it 
is indispensable to recognise the importance and urgency of action to tackle climate change 
on the urban level. On the one hand, cities have to develop strategies and instruments to 
reduce their GHG emissions (mitigation). (See e.g. Bulkeley 2013, p.108) On the other hand, 
cities have to become more resilient to climate change by adapting their infrastructures 
according to the predicted risks caused by climate change, taking into consideration also the 
most vulnerable groups and neighbourhoods (adaptation) (See e.g. Bulkeley 2013, p.144). 
Where international agreements sometimes lacked in effectiveness, range of influence 
and concrete measures, urban climate change and energy policies have been brought forward 
successively since the early 1990s. With the formation of the first international cities networks 
(e.g. ICLEI, Climate Alliance and Energie Cités) to promote and exchange climate change 
policies – most of them focused on mitigation – climate change concerns were more commonly 
included in urban political agendas, both in developed and developing countries (Bulkeley 
2013, pp.72–73). 
The role of urban governments and the notion of leadership 
Urban governments face the challenge of managing not only the horizontal 
interdependencies of the actors on the local level, but also of balancing them in the framework 
of the vertical multi-level system. (Bulkeley 2013, p.100; Ohlhorst et al. 2013) In the transition 
management literature that is often used to analyse low carbon energy transitions (see e.g. 
1 PhD candidate, Environmental Policy Research Centre (FFU), Freie Universität Berlin; gloria.amoruso@fu-
berlin.de   
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Schneidewind & Scheck 2012; Verbong & Geels 2007; Kern 2006), it is stated: 
“So government can and should assume a leading role in transition management. 
Not by acting as the great commander, enforcing change, but by inspiring a 
collective learning process and encouraging other actors to think along and 
participate.” (Rotmans et al. 2001, p.25). 
Rotmans et al., thus, point out that a government should adopt a directing and coordinating 
role to facilitate change and participation during the transition, understood as a recurrent 
learning process. This notion is likewise relevant to the urban policies of climate change to 
explain the modes of governance on the local level to manage the energy transition. In this 
paper, the urban governance of the energy transition in Berlin, which more in depth is subject 
to a dissertation project, will be analysed. The question of whether Berlin can be seen as a 
leader in the urban energy transition or not will be addressed. To assess Berlin’s performance 
Underdal’s definition of leadership will be applied, from which three qualifying actions of 
leadership derive: the pursuit of common good, positive influence and fellowship. 
“Leadership is an asymmetrical relationship of influence in which one actor guides 
or directs the behaviour of others toward a certain goal over a certain period of time. 
(…) For one thing, a leader is supposed to exercise what might be called positive 
influence, guiding rather than vetoing collective action. Thus, leadership is 
associated with the collective pursuit of some common good of joint purpose.” 
(Underdal 1994, p.178) 
Case selection: what is interesting about Berlin? 
“If Berlin is not able to make it, who else is?” 
Germany, as a frontrunner country in the energy transition, is getting a lot of 
international attention (Weidner 2008). Since cities matter to mitigate climate change, Berlin as 
a capital of this relatively rich country is under pressure to contribute to the fulfilment of the  
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1.5-2.0-degree target.2 In public discussion it is thus often repeated: “if Berlin is not able to 
realise the energy transition, who else is?” Berlin’s socio-economic conditions, which will be 
introduced in the following section, constitute the city as an interesting case study for urban 
energy transitions. It could serve as an example or learning laboratory for other cities to govern 
the energy transition. 
Berlin – a diverse and contradictory city 
Berlin is not only the capital but also the largest city of Germany in terms of its 
population and area. Data from December 2014 calculate more than 3.56 Million inhabitants 
living in an area of 891.7 km2. (AfS Berlin-Brandenburg 2015b) Among the inhabitants, 13% 
are foreigners and nearly 29% have a migrational background (AfS Berlin Brandenburg 2015a). 
This is only one aspect of Berlin being a diverse and sometimes also a contradictory city. 
Berlin is known as one of the “poorest German Länder” with a total debt of 70.33 Billion 
Euros, which is equal to approximately 20,000 Euros per capita (Statistisches Bundesamt 
2014)3. While Berlin’s public budget is lacking in financial resources, it is still the German start-
up capital, which attracts a lot of investors (McKinsey&Company 2013). Furthermore, Berlin’s 
Gross Domestic Product has been growing constantly in recent years. With an overall amount 
of 109.2 Billion Euros in 2013 it reaches an inflation-adjusted growth of 1.2% compared to the 
previous year. Nevertheless, in total it remains slightly under the German average. (AfS Berlin-
Brandenburg 2014b) Berlin’s economic development is coherent with being a growing start-up 
community as well as the increase in population, which is estimated to continue in the coming 
years. (AfS Berlin-Brandenburg 2015c, p.23; Reusswig et al. 2014, p.29) At the same time studies 
published in 2014 (AfS Berlin- Brandenburg 2014a) and 2015 (Krause et al. 2014) confirm that 
the gap between the high- and low-income occupations exacerbates the financial situation of 
Berlin’s citizens. In 2014 21.4% were located under the relative poverty line4. 11.7% of Berliners 
2 During the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP21), held in Paris in December 2015, the 1.5-2.0-degree 
Celsius target has been stipulated as part of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC). The Conference of the Parties thereby recognised that there is a need to intensify the 
mitigation efforts in order to hold “the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C 
above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-
industrial levels” (UNFCCC 2015, p.2).  
3 Concerning the total debt per capita, Berlin is second in the ranking of the German Länder; only the city-
state Bremen has a higher debt (Statistisches Bundesamt 2014). 
4 Accordingly, to EU-wide calculations the relatively poverty rate is referred to every person in a household 
whose income lies below 60% of the national average income. These data are necessarily not equal to 
poverty, but are an applicable indicator for people at risk (Krause et al. 2014, p.2). 
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were unemployed (AfS Berlin-Brandenburg 2015a), whereas yet 20.7% received public financial 
support (Krause et al. 2014), which is another indicator for socio-economic vulnerability. 
Berlin´s climate change policies in a multi-level system 
Berlin in a multi-level system 
Berlin is one of three German city states: an urban area which officiates concurrently 
as one of the German federal administrations, Länder. The social structure differs in the 
different urban areas and neighbourhoods and even among the twelve existing administrative 
districts within Berlin, therefore a uniform urban development policy seems unsuitable. The 
districts themselves, each one with a population size that ranges from 220,000 to 367,000 
people (AfS Berlin-Brandenburg 2015a), could be treated as small cities. Indeed, they behave 
as self-governing units without legal personality. Together with the Berlin Senate – that is the 
Berlin government with five different Senate Departments controlled by the House of 
Representatives – the twelve districts form a two-tier system.  
In 2006, the Berlin Senate additionally introduced a new planning procedure on a 
smaller scale to differentiate between the various urban living environments and created inter 
alia 447 so-called “Lebensweltlich Orientierte Räume = LOR” (areas based on the living 
environment). This differentiation makes tailor-made local planning possible on the one hand, 
but on the other hand it amplifies the complexity and the necessity for co-ordination of urban 
planning, not to forget also the underlying framework of national and EU legislation 
(SenStadtUm 2016). 
Berlin’s climate policy targets 
Berlin has been proclaiming its international leadership role for sustainable energy 
transitions in cities aspiring to act like a best-practice example for several years. This can be 
found repeatedly in documents and publications by the Berlin Senate and other stakeholders. 
Mayor Michael Müller, the former Senator for Urban Development and Environment, stated in 
2014: 
“...more and more cities are searching for ways to provide a local contribution 
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against climate change. Berlin is one of them and wants to be a role model for other 
cities.” (SenStadtUm 2014, p.3) 
The Berlin-specific climate policy targets, certainly, could be classed as ambitious for a city 
known mainly as an energy consumer. Already in 2009 in the overall concept for energy policy 
(Energiepolitisches Leitbild) and further on in the Energy Plan 2020 (Energiekonzept 2020), 
published in 2011, the overall target of Berlin becoming climate neutral by 2050 has been fixed. 
Climate neutrality is operationalised as the progressive reduction of CO2 emissions by about 
85% compared to the reference year 1990. That means that the annual CO2 emissions have to 
decrease to 4.4 Million tons compared to 29.3 Million tons in 1990 by 2050. 50% of the target 
should be already reached by 2030. (Berliner Energieagentur (BEA) 2009; Hirschl et al. 2011) 
These goals have just become legally binding, as, in March 2016, the Berlin Parliament passed 
the so- called “Energy Turnaround Act” or “Energy Transition Act” (Energiewendegesetz) 
(Abgeordnetenhaus Berlin 2016). 
Institutionalisation of Berlin’s climate change policies and main stakeholders 
It is a decisive moment in time for Berlin’s energy transition in the context of climate 
change. Berlin has been trying to promote its policies and new approaches of participation and 
policy design procedures recently. In 2016, the above-mentioned so-called “Energy 
Turnaround Act” recently came into force and therefore the Berlin Senate has to propose an 
action plan for energy and climate change to the Berlin Parliament within three months (i.e. 
by June 2016). Furthermore, there have been several institutional changes since the new local 
government, formed by the big coalition between the “Social Democratic Party” (SPD) and the 
“Christian Democratic Party” (CDU), took charge in 2011: 
• The restructuring of the administration with the formation of the “Special Unit for
Climate Protection and Energy” (Sonderreferat für Klimaschutz und Energie)
• The mandate of a scientific consortium to conduct the feasibility study “Klimaneutrales 
Berlin 2050” which attests that meeting the goal of climate neutrality can be fulfilled
through different scenarios and measures
• The mandate and the publication of a draft for an “Energy and Climate Protection
Concept” (Berliner Energie- und Klimaschutz Konzept = BEK) in December 2015, and;
• The calling of a “Committee of Enquiry New Energy for Berlin” (Enquete- Kommisson 
“Neue Energie für Berlin”) by the Berlin Parliament that adopted their final report in
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October 2015. 
With the “Special Unit for Climate Protection and Energy” a new actor within the Berlin Senate 
was brought to life, in order to facilitate the climate change and energy policy activities among 
the different departments and the different stakeholders. The “Committee for Enquiry” 
together with the “Climate Change Advisory Council”, on the other hand, function as a 
consultant. Both for the formulation of the feasibility study and the process for “Berlin’s Energy 
and Climate Protection Concept”, co-design methods have been used. Besides politicians and 
different scientific institutes, private enterprises and umbrella organisations (above all from the 
energy and building sector), as well as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have also been 
involved in stakeholder-workshops and/or offline and online consultations (Hirschl et al. 2015). 
As described above the twelve districts also have to be regarded as single actors for 
Berlin’s climate change policies. According to their legal position in Berlin the districts are not 
given much leeway for climate change related activities, but they are still responsible for 
implementing the climate change policies locally as well as developing their own district-
related goals and monitoring the outcomes. This has been integrated in the “Berlin Energy 
Turnaround Act”. (Abgeordnetenhaus Berlin 2016, para.9) Hence, also on the local level in Berlin, 
different concepts and levels of implementation of climate change policies can be found. Some 
districts appear especially active and others do not really deal with the politics of the city’s 
energy transition. Districts of Zehlendorf-Steglitz, Marzahn-Hellersdorf, Lichtenberg, 
Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg, for instance, have climate commissioners, and sometimes also quite 
detailed climate policy concepts, whereas Charlottenburg-Wilmersdorf installed a roundtable with 
different district stakeholders. 
Selected policy instruments 
Beyond the “Energy Turnaround Act”, there have been several instruments to mitigate 
climate change, which vary from information platforms to concrete projects that have a direct 
influence on energy savings. An online communication platform for energy efficiency has been 
established, called “Berliner ImpulsE”, which is also responsible for the organisation of the 
annual “Berlin Energy Days”5. 
The “Energy Saving Partnerships” (Energiespartpartnerschaften), often called 
5 The Berlin Energy Days are considered the biggest conference on energy efficiency in Germany. In 2016, 
according to the organisers, more than 9,000 participants attended a total of 54 single events held in three 
days. The Berlin Energy Days 2016 have been the 17th edition (Berlin Energietage 2015).  
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performance contracting, and running since 1996, are a very concrete instrument. The Berlin 
Senate, together with other stakeholders, founded the “Berlin Energy Agency” (Berliner 
Energieagentur), which established this hands-on method to foster the installation and 
investment in energy efficiency technologies for public buildings through public and private 
partnerships. (Berliner Energieagentur 2015) The method, at the beginning, was motivated by 
financial shortages, but then became a replicable model. (Bulkeley et al. 2015) This instrument 
is supplemented by voluntary “Climate Protection Agreements” (Klimaschutzvereinbarungen) 
between the Berlin Senate and the major CO2-emitters. So far voluntary agreements with 
eleven partners have been developed, inter alia   with   the   biggest   energy   providers, a 
university, associations and umbrella organisations from the building sector, and waste and 
water services (Land Berlin & Vattenfall Europe AG 2009; Land Berlin & BBU 2011; Land Berlin & 
GASAG AG 2011; SenStadtUm 2015). 
The voluntary climate protection agreements demonstrate how the Berlin Senate tries 
to stimulate action for mitigating climate change also beyond binding legal obligations, where 
the local government has lost its policy capacity due to privatisation in the 1990s. (Monstadt 
2007)6 This approach is classified by Kern and Gotelind (2008) as governing by enabling. 
Additionally, corresponding funding programmes have been put in place, namely the 
“UEP” (Umweltentlastungsprogramm) that has been replaced recently by a very similar 
programme called BENE, both based on the European Union’s Grants Programmes. Moreover, 
the “Berlin Energy Fund” (Berliner Energiefonds), provided by the Investitionsbank Berlin (IBB), 
offers support for the development of innovative technologies for the energy transition 
(Berliner Energieagentur/IÖW 2011). 
It is important to point out that, in addition to the top-down approaches of the urban 
governance of the energy transition, several bottom-up initiatives as well as best practice 
projects have arisen in recent years. Very prominent among them are the “Berliner 
Energietisch” (Berlin Energy Roundtable) and the “BürgerEnergie Berlin” (Citizen Energy). Both 
initiatives foster the creation of a more democratic, social and ecological energy supply 7 
(Berliner Energietisch 2012; Berliner Energietisch 2013; Berliner Energietisch 2015). 
6 The 1990s are distinguished by a wave of privatization, where, inter alia, also the energy utilities have 
been sold gradually to private companies (Monstadt 2007). 
7 The Berliner Energietisch (Berlin Energy Roundtable) led to a referendum in 2013, that failed due to 
the missed 25% quorum. 
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Reality check – what has Berlin achieved so far? 
To assess the effectiveness of Berlin’s energy policies so far it is useful to examine some 
data on energy consumption and supply as well as their performance in reducing CO2 
emissions. Annual reports on the Berlin-specific balance of energy and CO2 emissions serve as 
a monitoring tool. The most recent data are based on the balance year 2012. Still, it is important 
not to neglect that also in the case of Berlin the correlation between CO2 emission reductions 
and the policy instruments in place cannot be verified as satisfactory. 
Reduction of CO2 emissions in Berlin 
Since 1990 a notable reduction in the use of primary energy and CO2 emissions can be 
observed. It is significant that the major alteration occurred between 1990 and 2005. Despite 
some deviation, there have not been notable changes since then. (AfS Berlin-Brandenburg 
2015c, p.23) Moss (2009) argues that the success in the reduction of CO2 emissions from 1990 
to 2005 was caused by the city’s reunification, which also implied a reunification of the energy 
infrastructures of East and West Berlin. Consequently, the energy supply became more 
efficient only by eliminating the oversupply due to redundancy of two parallel systems (Moss 
2013; Moss 2009). 
Berlin’s energy mix 
Moving to the development of renewable energies in Berlin, more progress can be 
traced. Starting with a percentage of only 0.6% of renewables in 1990 in the use of primary 
energy and 0.5% in the use of end energy, by 2012 the percentage of renewable energy 
reached 3.6% for primary and 1.7% for end energy use. Additionally, 7.7% of the electricity 
production in Berlin and 4.0% of the district heating (Fernwärme) are based on renewable 
energy sources. Nonetheless, the overall composition of Berlin’s energy use by energy sources 
in 2012 demonstrates that Berlin’s energy supply is still based on a significant majority of fossil 
fuels with mineral oil, gas and lignite as the most important energy sources (AfS Berlin- 
Brandenburg 2015c). 
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Berlin’s performance from a comparative perspective 
Contrasted with the other German Länder, Berlin is lagging behind. It can be found in 
second to last or last place in all categories in terms of the percentage of renewables for end 
energy use as well as the production of electricity and district heating. Certainly, a comparison 
with the largely rural Länder is not viable, but even in relation to the other two German city 
states (Hamburg and Bremen) Berlin’s performance is relatively poor. For instance, in Bremen 
already around 23% of the district heating and in Hamburg more than 11% of electricity 
production are based on renewables (Diekmann et al. 2014). 
In the same comparative study, on the contrary, the leading by example of Berlin’s 
administration has been highlighted as the best practice for the use of renewable energies for 
public buildings. (Diekmann et al. 2014, p.30) In this regard, it is also testified that Berlin 
citizens seem to be the greenest consumers, where nearly a third has chosen an eco-electricity 
provider8. (Diekmann et al. 2014, p.31) Furthermore, a recent study indicates that the mobility 
behaviour of Berlin citizens has become increasingly environmentally friendly (SenStadtUm 
2011, pp.15, 16; Ahrens 2014). 
Finally, scholars underline Berlin’s role as a pioneer in the context of the development 
of the “Energy Saving Partnerships” (Energiespartpartnerschaften), described above. (Bulkeley 
et al. 2015, p.138) These partnerships have proved apparently to be at least a partial solution to 
the investment costs related to the energy transition for a city with an overcharged budget. 
Conclusion: to lead or not to lead? – Berlin’s performance in the energy transition 
Berlin demands for itself a leadership role for the urban energy transition to become a 
positive example for other European cities. Indeed, Berlin has set ambitious goals to contribute 
to the mitigation of climate change in the global context and therefore follows a pursuit of 
common good (see Underdal 1994). But its self-perception is opposed to the status quo and it 
has to be questioned, if the goals are realistic to achieve considering the city’s challenges. 
Energy consumption in Berlin is still based on fossil fuels and previous outcomes concerning 
the reduction of CO2 emissions since 1990 are mainly related to the city’s reunification. Berlin 
is not only lagging behind other German cities, but it is far from being a European role model 
8 The percentage of green electricity costumers range from 16 to 28% in the different German Länder 
(Diekmann et al. 2014, p.31). 
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for energy transition. 
Nevertheless, there are some areas where Berlin has potential for leadership. Firstly, its 
reputation as the start-up capital and the associated incentives for investors could facilitate its 
reputation as a centre for innovative technologies as part of the energy transition. Secondly, as 
described above, the “Energy Saving Partnerships” have contributed to realising some of the 
energy renovation plans for public buildings. This instrument provided a replicable method to 
promote concrete energy saving measures and has served therefore as a positive example for 
other cities. (Bulkeley et al. 2015, p.138) According to Underdal’s (1994) definition Berlin already 
got fellowship in this limited area. Additionally, it was a form of leading by example and sample 
of urban climate change self-governing (Kern & Gotelind 2008). Thirdly, despite its poor 
financial and institutional resources some findings demonstrate that Berlin can build on 
positive resources relating to social and environmental capital. As stated above, for a third of 
Berlin’s citizens, sustainable energy supply and mobility matter. In this regard, civil society 
organisations and initiatives, such as the “Berliner Energietisch” and “BürgerEnergie Berlin”, 
and many other best practice projects, should also not be neglected. These factors could unfold 
a positive influence (see Underdal 1994) on other cities in the future. 
Regarding the leading potential of the local government some efforts to promote 
participatory approaches as well as stimulate voluntary activities to mitigate climate change 
beyond the local policy capacity have been initiated. With the “Special Unit for Climate 
Protection and Energy” a new co-ordinator of the energy transition in Berlin was put in place, 
which has to fulfil the task of bringing all the stakeholders together to co-design the energy 
transition. Governing by enabling through the voluntary “Climate Protection Agreements” have 
served in this context as a first attempt; opening the development of the integrated “Berlin 
Energy and Climate Protection Concept” to the public discussion has been the second. 
Altogether Berlin’s performance in the energy transition is neither yet sufficient to reach 
its self-set climate policy targets, nor to act as a real role model for other cities. Still, the 
potential for future developments towards a climate neutral city is visible though challenging 
to realise in such a diverse city with several social matters to be addressed. In summary, it can 
be argued that Berlin is characterised as being a city with many societal challenges and a lack 
of institutional and financial resources. Where Bulkeley/Broto/Edwards (2015, p.139) state: 
“(…) Berlin’s poverty (both in financial and institutional terms) remains its greatest challenge 
as it seeks to reposition itself as a green energy leader.” But at the same time, Berlin has 
potential for innovation concerning the start-up community, its appeal for expatriates and 
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investors as well as an active community. 
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Transformative heat risk policies? Political discourses and their impacts on 
implementation – the case of Berlin, Germany 
Nicole Mahlkow1, Tobias Kalt2 
Even though heat waves occur less frequently in Europe than floods they cause a 
substantially higher number of deaths (EEA 2010). Some sources estimate that 70,000 people died 
in the heat wave of 2003 (Robine et al. 2008; Kovats and Ebi 2006). Heat not only causes high 
mortality rates, morbidity and well-being can be affected likewise.  
Age (with very young and very old people prone to suffer more), state of health and the built 
environment have been identified as factors determining the vulnerability to heat stress. Socio-
economic criteria and, not least, the subjective assessment of one’s own risk and consequent 
behaviors also determine the impact of heat on the individual (Großmann et al. 2012). 
Consequently, vulnerability to heat varies from place to place, building to building and person to 
person (Klok and Klueck 2015). 
Cities concentrate people and critical infrastructure systems in a relatively small space and 
are at the center of heat risk analysis. The so called urban heat island (UHI) effect can cause certain 
areas in cities to be up to 12 degrees warmer than the surrounding countryside (Klysik and Fortuniak 
1999, Hung et al. 2005). This locally induced climate change (Stone 2012) is down to a specific land-
use in cities: lesser vegetation, large shares of dark surfaces, specific arrangements of buildings that 
trap heat and the concentration of human activities that produce waste heat (Oke 1982). With global 
climate change the exposure to heat compounds in cities, extreme weather events might get more 
intense, longer and are likely to happen more frequently (Meehl and Tebaldi 2004). Heat load might 
also worsen with gradually rising average daily temperatures.  
An immense amount of natural science research has focused on risk assessments and 
measures for heat adaptation and mitigation in cities. When all kinds of impacts and causes of urban 
heat are considered, a large variety of policy options to tackle risks are conceivable. However, to 
date, critical social science reflections on political coping strategies with heat risks are not very 
common. A heat risk policy analysis that focuses on patterns of meaning underlying the local 
constructions of vulnerability and resilience can give valuable insights into the configuration of 
policy practice. We try to draw conclusions on barriers to political and administrative action 
concerning urban heat in mid-latitude cities by studying local discourses in the field of public policy-
1PhD candidate, Environmental Policy Research Centre (FFU), Freie Universität Berlin; nicole.mahlkow@fu-
berlin.de   
2 M.A. student, Environmental Policy Research Centre (FFU), Freie Universität Berlin; t.kalt@fu-berlin.de  
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making. 
Research approach 
Our approach is located in the field of critical adaptation studies. Dietz and Brunnengräber 
(2016) sum up critical notions of current research and policy-making in the field of climate change 
adaptation: the creation of adaptation policy is often characterized by a climate deterministic 
problem definition. It then neglects social conditions that determine how impacts of a changing 
climate are experienced by social groups. In this regard, the authors claim adaptation to be a policy 
field that is largely de–politicized. Managerial procedures dominate decision-making processes, 
political solutions are reduced to technological innovations, infrastructure measures and 
governance optimization. A common strategy is to execute adaptation policy in a top-down 
manner. Consultation processes are the main form of including different stakeholder perspectives, 
thus limiting the localization potentials (i.e. participation, democratic character) of adaptation 
policies (ibid). 
Dietz and Brunnengräber (2013) conclude that the adaptation to climate change as it is 
often understood in current research and executed in decision-making has not reached a 
transformative potential but perpetuates social inequities. This view focuses on adaptation 
practice; especially the power struggles and contested meaning it is embedded in.  
Referring to the critical assumptions of Dietz and Brunnengräber (2013, 2016) it shall be 
hypothesized that local political adaptation discourses do not just influence the transformational 
or non-transformational character of adaptation. The configuration of political discourses is a 
critical factor if implementation practice to raise urban adaptive capacity is pursued at all. 
Analysing the topic of urban heat, it shall be hypothesized that political adaptation discourses are 
of structural-conservative nature, impeding proactive action instead of incentivizing it. 
Urban climate change adaptation is constructed discursively and expresses itself 
materially. The study focuses on the knowledge that circulates in the policy process and how that 
knowledge influences implementation prospects. To analyse political discourses, official 
documents referring to climate change adaptation and urban heat have been analysed. The study 
included documents that were published between 2007 and 2014; among them political plans, 
concepts and strategies, protocols of parliament and council meetings. Additionally, interviews 
with 18 administrative officials have been conducted between 2013 and 2015.  
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Heat risk policy in mid-latitude cities: the case of Berlin 
The city of Berlin, with its moderate climate of warm summers and cold winters (Peel et al. 
2007) does not come to mind first when thinking about cities suffering from urban heat. Urban 
development as well as the urban way of living is not characterized by experience with extreme 
temperatures. This includes not only local building traditions and the configuration of 
infrastructure, but also the organization of work and social life. Nevertheless, statistical analysis has 
demonstrated that the urban heat island effect potentially causes up to 1600 excess deaths in the 
city per year (Scherer et al. 2013). Climate change projections show a range of rising temperatures 
of up to 2.5°C with more extreme weather events by 2050 (Lotze-Campen et al. 2009). 
Within Berlin authorities the topic of urban heat mainly manifests itself in climate change 
adaptation discourses. The city is considered a frontrunner concerning policy instrument creation 
for climate change adaptation with special regards to heat risks (e.g. BBSR 2015), and it is praised 
for innovative approaches to highly scientifically informed policy-making. An example referred to in 
that respect is Berlin’s climate change adaptation plan (StEP Klima), adopted by the local 
parliament and published in 2011. The plan conceptualizes urban climate, including urban heat, as 
an urban development task. It shows the urban heat load for current and future night and daytime 
situations (2001 to 2010; 2046 to 2055) in a spatially differentiated way for the entire city. Moreover, 
the plan introduces measures for different urban structure types and it outlines possible 
governance and planning strategies for their implementation, including an action plan for model 
projects.  
Berlin’s climate change adaptation plan has been adopted in the legal form of an urban 
development plan (SenStadtUm 2011a). Urban planning officials are obliged to examine every 
planning process whether it conflicts with or confirms to the goals of urban development plans. This 
is one of the reasons why StEP Klima is considered to be an outstanding instrument for the 
adaptation to climate change in German planning practice. Another specific of the strategy is its 
corresponding instrument, the Urban Landscape Strategy. It outlines assets and potentials of urban 
green in the city (SenStadtUm 2011b). 
Regardless of these instruments, interviews with decision-makers on the executive level in 
Berlin districts revealed that since StEP Klima’s launch in 2011, not much has changed in the city 
with regards to heat risk awareness and prevention. From interviews it can be concluded that 
concise implementation action for heat risk adaptation has not happened in Berlin. 
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Results: Berlin authorities’ heat risk discourse  
Constructions of heat vulnerabilities  
O’Brien et al. (2007) identify two main vulnerability constructs in climate change discourses: 
outcome vulnerability and contextual vulnerability. Whereas outcome vulnerability is a “linear 
result of projected impacts of climate change on a particular exposure unit” (ibid, p.75), contextual 
vulnerability refers to the dynamical entwinements between climate variability and changes in 
political, institutional, economic and social structures. The authors show that within climate 
change discourses, different framings of vulnerability matter with regards to the produced and 
prioritized climate change responses. 
Hence, the way urban heat risks and vulnerabilities are constructed is decisive for local 
adaptation or mitigation action. Heat discourses in Berlin policy documents reflect O’Brien et al.’s 
(2007) outcome vulnerability conception in focusing on localized climatology constructions for the 
hazard of rising temperatures. Gradually increasing heat load rather than extreme heat waves and 
associated risks are at the centre of attention. In Berlin, climate change adaptation discourses mark 
out the configuration of the urban structure as the main risk factor. The exposure to high 
temperatures in a non-adapted urban fabric is the factor to explain why heat becomes risky for the 
urban population and fabric. This narrow vulnerability construction excludes sensitivity factors like 
income, education or behaviour. Critical adaptation research speaks of a “naturalization” of the 
social (Dietz and Brunnengräber 2016); meaning that the search for an answer to the question why 
some people are more vulnerable than others often starts with, and mainly refers to, an analysis of 
climatic conditions. 
By largely blending out different kinds of sensitivity factors for heat vulnerability, Berlin’s 
climate change adaptation strategy does not target the most vulnerable. Vulnerability 
constructions do not focus on human beings at risk; the attention shifts towards the heat exposure 
of the inanimate entity of the city and its urban structure. Even though heat hubs are localized at 
the city centre, the resulting risk construction and demands to act remain vague, making it difficult 
for urban planning officials and stakeholders to feel addressed as responsible. 
Constructing heat risk action 
The Berlin discourses on dealing with urban heat focus on a catalogue of measures, which 
is closely connected with the identified vulnerability conception. O’Brien et al. (2007) associate the 
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‘outcome vulnerability’ discourse with strategies of reducing exposure through climate change 
mitigation or developing adaptations to limit negative outcomes. In the case of Berlin this includes 
heat reduction strategies of urban development like façade and roof greening, and albedo 
enhancement for different urban structure types. The rather technical focus marginalizes ideas, 
which focus on different vulnerability constructions - also within the realm of urban development. 
In this regard, urban development policies which aim at changing the societal context on 
the basis of equity and justice (O’Brien 2007) have only marginally been linked with the topic of 
climate change in Berlin in the research period3. Also, behavioural changes incentivized by changing 
the urban fabric – among them could be governance approaches to ensure short distances to and 
accessibility of important daily life infrastructure - play no role in the discourse. In relation to this 
point, a recent study suggests a strong connection between health, fitness and individual heat 
stress, providing evidence that urban development governance which increases activity levels 
among citizens decreases their heat sensitivity (Schuster et al. in  preparation). 
Drinking fountains or cooling centres - urban development measures that would relate 
more explicitly to disaster risk reduction - also play no role. Moreover, shading amenities have 
surprisingly little prominence in the discourse on urban heat in Berlin. By not emphasizing urban 
development approaches that facilitate living with heat and accepting different climatic conditions, 
climate change adaptation discourses mainly reflect mitigation logics of reducing the climatic 
impact. Land use change is the preferred strategy focusing on urban green as means to achieve that. 
Two discursive strands deal with green as a heat mitigation measure: On the one hand 
there is a discourse on the qualification of green space with regards to optimizing and qualifying 
their ecosystem services. On the other hand, a strand that is rooted in the “no regret” concept can 
be found, a common but ambiguous concept used in scientific and political discourses on climate  
3 The Berlin Environmental Justice map has broadened the risk analysis. However, it has not been integrated 
into the empirical material, as it was published in 2015. Also the AFOK report (Adaptation to the impacts of 
climate change), published in 2016, has not been included here. Both documents were “work in progress”, but 
not yet part of the official political discourses in the research period. 
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change4. In Berlin, part of the discourse on urban green space contradicts the idea of an urban 
planning based approach to qualify urban green. This discursive strand frames urban green as 
generally good and necessary and shall therefore be labelled “no regret” approach to urban green. 
The former strand aims at reducing vulnerabilities to climatic impacts explicitly by 
providing in depth knowledge on positions of green and selection of types and sorts. This strand 
seems to be de-politicized and rather technocratic. It confirms findings of critical adaptation 
research (e.g. Brunnengräber and Dietz 2013; Dietz and Brunnengräber 2015). Possible local 
frictions that might arise in the course of implementing these measures are not part of the discourse. 
Conflictive potentials are constricted to clashes with heritage protection, whereas local experiences 
gained when dealing with other contested urban development policies have not found a way into 
official climate change adaptation discourses. For instance, the energy orientated modernization of 
apartment buildings has occasionally led to protests by residents. Especially in socially deprived 
areas it often raises fears of rising rents (e.g. FuldaWeichsel 2014; Färber 2013). Creating or restoring 
environmental goods might involve similar distributional dynamics, which could increase social 
inequity. For example, environmental amenities, like green roofs, facades and parks can drive up 
property values if public policy does not intervene and potentially leads to “green gentrification” 
(Gould and Lewis 2012). 
Similarly, in Berlin, political discourses on urban green space focus on its potentials to raise 
the quality of life. Economic consequences of the installation of adaptive greening measures, 
among them distributional ones, have not been given attention within the political discourses. By 
blending them out the discourse becomes depoliticized and de-localized, which might counteract 
the initial intention to raise acceptance and instead decrease legitimacy of heat risk policy. Projects 
trying to pursue proposed greening measures might face substantial opposition. 
However, labelling urban green as “no regret” also has its flaws. It might reduce its heat 
mitigation and adaptation focus. The “no regrets” concept with regards to urban greening 
measures seems to refer to the different kinds of ecosystem services they provide for human beings 
4 The “no regrets” concept has an economic background and has originally been applied for “GHG emission 
reduction options that have negative net costs, because they generate direct or indirect benefits that are large 
enough to offset the costs of implementing the options” (IPCC 2001). Later it was taken up within the 
adaptation community, for example by Füssel (2007, p.273) who defines “no regret” options as “actions whose 
costs in a broad sense are small or even negative under all plausible climate scenarios”. As head of the 
Metropolis city network, Berlin’s Senate Department of Urban Development and the Environment published 
the “No regrets” Charter on the urban adaptation to climate change. “No regrets” strategies are explained as 
being “based on concepts and measures that can begin to be enacted now without being certain about all 
dimensions of future climate change.(...) Such measures are advisable for future generations, but also relevant 
to enhancing the living conditions of people in the present. With a ‘no regrets’ strategy, the benefit of these 
measures to society therefore continues even in the absence of climate change” (SenStadtUm, n.d.).   
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in an unspecific way. Any kind of green, no matter where and what sort of plants, exerts positive 
functions, such as air filtration, micro climate regulation, noise reduction, sewage treatment, and 
recreational and cultural values (Bolund and Hunhammar 1999). Nevertheless, it remains vague 
who is supposed to have no regrets with regards to the installation of measures. The basic 
assumption underlying the “no regrets” discourses seems to be an economic one - unprofitable 
investment shall be avoided. This strand of the Berlin adaptation discourse backs up economic 
logics of urban development – greening measures are of no regret in the logic of Berlin political 
discourses if they raise the quality of life in an area, which also implies attracting investors and 
people at the higher end of the social stratification pyramid. Protecting the most vulnerable is not 
necessarily intended when referring to “no regret” measures, but reducing exposure in an unspecific 
way. 
Localizing heat adaptation discourses 
At first glance the Berlin discourse on measures to mitigate urban heat seems to have no 
specific link to local traditions, norms and narratives. However, local discourses on climate change 
adaptation do not ignore local bottom up developments completely. Civil society practices of 
adopting open spaces for greening purposes, taking various forms like urban gardening or guerrilla 
gardening, have been harnessed into official urban development discourses. Integrating local 
cultural trends such as bottom–up greening activities with the urban development agenda of 
climate change adaptation seems to oppose assumptions of critical climate change adaptation 
research. 
The integration of these local bottom-up strategies into the discourse, however, serves to 
underline the narrative of the “green city of Berlin”. It is a promotional discourse that is used for 
place marketing and interurban competition, rather than providing and including local knowledge 
to actively engage civil society actors in urban planning for heat mitigation. Policy documents 
convey the narrative that Berlin has no deficits regarding the provision of green, but lacks in 
communicating its green amenities. 
The discursive strategy to market Berlin as a green city might undermine demands for action 
to mitigate and adapt to urban heat. To install further or even preserve urban green as a matter of 
heat mitigation and adaptation is not perceived necessary in a city that is already very green. 
Furthermore, urban political discourses absorb civil society niches to raise the city’s economic 
competitiveness and its international attractiveness. Adopting these niches for interurban 
competitive reasons may create frictions with the logics of these social innovations and may lead 
    UAS Spring Campus 2016 Conference Proceedings 
UAS Working Paper 01/2017   71  
to their co-optation. A similar mobilization of temporary uses in Berlin has been shown within the 
context of discursive and policy shifts towards “creative city” marketing strategies (Colomb 2012). 
As Bader and Bialluch (2008, pp.98-99) point out, “reducing interim and small-scale users to being 
solely a marketing tool for real estate in the city, combined with the lack of any strategy for their 
support, undermines the development of a proper long-term creative city policy”.  
These political discourses might therefore, in the long term, countermand discursively 
constructed advantages with regards to climate change adaptation and urban heat connected with 
the narrative of “the green Berlin”. This is especially significant in the more densely populated city-
center, where smaller open spaces and green spaces - considered important for heat stress 
mitigation (Bowler et al. 2010, Chang et al. 2007) - need to give way to re-development projects 
(Kartschall and Büchner 2015). 
Conclusions 
Berlin’s climate change adaptation discourses in the research period reflect the latest 
knowledge in climatologically informed urban planning. Nevertheless, they do not incentivize local 
actors to actively pursue the adaptation to a changing local climate and society. On the contrary, 
they seem to be rather preservative of the status quo. 
With their unspecific heat risk constructions, the climate change discourses do not include 
well-defined political targets and demands to act. Referring to “no regret”- strategies in the domain 
of greening measures while repeatedly trying to confirm that Berlin is already a very green city, hints 
at the climate change adaptation discourse being made to fit current logics of urban development 
rather than transforming them. Even though there is a localization strategy, its motive is not to 
foster heat adaptation by integrating bottom-up initiatives. These initiatives are in fact used to 
position the city in interurban competitions. Berlin heat adaptation discourses therefore confirm 
critical adaptation research arguments by showing a strategy that is pursued in a top down manner 
and lacks a considerable debate on the possible conflicts.  
To gain acceptance and incentivize adaptation action, the scientifically informed discourse 
would benefit from becoming more inclusive. That could, for instance, encompass a better 
representation of local risk perceptions by negotiating climate change policies within the context 
of local culture and practice. To fully grasp the diverse construct of vulnerability to heat, sensitivity 
factors need to be included demanding scientific analysis but local communication processes as 
well. 
Consequently, the climate change strategy could profit from strengthening the role of 
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smaller scale administrative units – the Berlin districts or even the neighbourhood level. They have 
not been integrated in the strategy creation and have only been consulted afterwards. These units 
could trigger and coordinate small scale adaptation discourses and strategies which better meet 
the needs, the current practices and the support the local population wants. 
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European conservation legislation: policies and politics in transition 
Tina Schivatcheva1 
The paper focuses on the most significant opportunities and tensions, arising from Natura 
2000, the pan-European biodiversity conservation governance regime. Perceiving the internal and 
external dimensions of the EU’s environmental persona as inter-linked, the analysis then seeks to 
map EU’s emergent conservation governance persona onto the existing theoretical constructs. 
Introduction 
Today globally and in Europe the erosion of biodiversity has become a serious threat. In 
the EU, only 17 % of the habitats and species and 11% of key ecosystems protected under EU 
legislation are in a favourable state (EC, 2011). At the same time 60% of the species assessments 
and 77% of habitat assessments continue to be in unfavourable conservation status (EEA, 2016). 
The EU has tried to counter this pressing threat by undertaking a commitment to halt biodiversity 
loss in Europe and help stop global biodiversity loss by 2020 (EC, 2017). In this regard, one of the 
most important governance innovations, designed by the European Commission (EC) is Natura 
2000 (N2000). N2000 is the largest coordinated network of protected areas in the world and it 
covers 18% of the EU’s land area and almost 6% of its marine territory (EC, 2016b). Yet the network 
is not an example of ‘fortress conservation’, but it represents a governance innovation: a novel 
nature-society hybrid (Zimmerer, 2000); one in which people are not seen as inimical to 
conservation, but as an integral part of it. The novel governance mode of the pan-European 
governance network actively encourages public participation in the governance process. 
The paper uses an analytical perspective informed by theories of European environmental 
governance, scholarship about the EU as an international environmental actor, and analyses 
seeking to combine both perspectives. By reflecting on these analytical insights within the 
concrete policies and politics of N2000 the discussion aims to improve the understanding of the 
EU's ability to be a successful conservation governance actor, while at the same time wielding 
influence in the global environmental conservation sphere. 
1 PhD candidate, Environmental Policy Research Centre (FFU), Freie Universität Berlin; tinas@zedat.fu-
berlin.de   
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Theoretical perspectives 
In the past the environmental policy instruments employed by the EU have been 
characterized as belonging to the hierarchical governance mode – i.e. relying on interventionist 
approaches, with state actors dominating the processes of decision-making, implementation and 
enforcement (Rehbinder  and Stewart, 1985; Holzinger et. al., 2009, 45). Today however, the EU’s 
formerly predominant environmental governance model has been undergoing a process of 
transformation (Lenschow, 2005, 39). The transformation reflects a global trend – one in which the 
hierarchical governance models have become increasingly contested and replaced by models, 
whereby negotiating and jointly-learning set of actors (Mayntz, 2003) use communicating and 
informational policy instruments (Lenschow, 2005, 40) to achieve the desired policy goals. The EU 
has increasingly subscribed to a network-style governance model, emphasizing the close 
cooperation of public and private actors in the formulation and implementation of EU’s 
environmental policy (Holzinger et. al., 2009, 45). Kingston (2013, 7) refer to this new governance 
mode as multi-level networked environmental governance. The new governance mode is 
characterized by more open and inclusive governance structures and the adoption of facilitating, 
cooperative, and consensual, rather than imposing mode of governance (Lenschow, 2005, 38).  
Concurrent with the internal governance transformation, the international environmental 
actorness of the EU has been a subject of much research consideration (Zito, 2005; Damro, 2006; 
Vogler, 2007; Kelemen, 2010; Zeto, 2011; Delreux, 2014). Notably though, the scholarly focus has 
been extensively captured by the EU’s at one point leadership role in the climate change 
negotiations (Oberthür and Kelly, 2008; Oberthür, 2011; Bäckstrand and Elgström, 2013; Oberthür 
and Rabitz, 2014; Fischer and Geden, 2015). EU, as a global conservation governance actor, has 
eschewed similarly ardent research attention, even though it has emerged as a major source of 
environmental governance innovation (Scott, 2009).  
Furthermore in addition to studies, entirely devoted to an inward or outward-looking 
analytical angles, a body of EU environmental governance scholarship has emerged, which has 
sought to explain and theorize the inter-linked aspects of the international and internal 
dimensions. Zito (2005) theorizes EU’s global role in environmental governance by linking EU’s 
internal and external dimensions via the identification of four notable roles: Negotiator, Innovator, 
Market and Model (to emulate). Although at this point the role of the EU as a Market (for imported 
goods) is not yet applicable to the biodiversity conservation issues, the other three roles find 
resonance with the EU’s stance. First of all, the role of the EU as Multilateral Negotiator has already 
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been theorized by Vogler (1999, 36). However, Zeto (2005, 370) expands the analysis by arguing 
that EU’s complex institutional structure, which includes diverse actors and voices may be an 
advantage in dealing with complex problems, because the variation in perspectives and voices of 
the EU may be attractive to its negotiating counter-parts. The strength of the EU as an Innovator 
has also been reflected upon by Weir (Weir, 1992). He submits that since the separate constituent 
units of the EU follow different learning paths and may even compete to find the best solutions, 
the EU has an inherent potential for learning and innovation (Weir, 1992, 192-4). Lastly, the role of 
the EU as a Model, which is to be emulated in an external context could be linked to the extensive 
literature on EU environmental leadership. 
Research has shown that leadership is an essential ingredient for addressing the collective 
action challenges associated with global environmental problems – e.g. such as climate change or 
biodiversity conservation. Leadership establishes a “relationship of influence in which one actor 
guides or directs the behavior of others toward a certain goal” (Underdal 1994, p. 178). Leadership 
is especially needed when confronting complex transnational problems, which are characterized 
by a high risk levels and significant cost to all parties involved, so collective action problems can 
threaten or undermine the effective policy-making (Karlsson et. al., 2012, 46). In this regard two EU 
leadership concepts, outlined by Delreux (2013, 301) as ‘’directional leadership’’ and ‘’ideas-based 
leadership’,’ provide insightful perspectives. Although initially theorized to explain EU’s role in the 
international climate change regime, the analysis argues that they could also be usefully applied 
towards understanding EU’s impact on global environmental conservation governance. 
The concept of credibility is of fundamental importance to studies, which discuss the 
‘’directional leadership’’ of the EU, admittedly in the context of its climate change commitment. 
Elgström (2010) promotes credibility as a key category underscoring the global resonance of the 
EU policies. He defines credibility as ‘an assumption that in order to be a successful leader, the 
EU’s external ambitions as a policy entrepreneur have to be matched by ‘domestic’ policies that 
demonstrate that the Union does what it preaches’ (Elgström, 2010). Consequently the EU has to 
‘lead by example’ (Elgström, 2010; Fischer and Geden, 2015), and create and implement internally 
the policies, which it strives to promote internationally. As for ideas-based leadership Delreux 
(2013, 301) refers to it as the ‘ability to impact on international climate policy agendas’. Idea-based 
leadership has been more comprehensively defined as ‘’problem naming and framing and the 
promotion of solutions to collective problems. This type of leadership is characterized by agenda 
setting efforts and includes discovering and proposing joint solutions to collective problems” 
(Karlsson et. al. 2012).  
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After introducing the broad theoretical perspectives informing the analysis, the discussion 
now turns towards elaborating upon the concrete aspects of N2000, exploring in more detail the 
ways in which the broad analytical constructs could be mapped onto the N2000 governance 
model. 
Natura 2000 
Natura 2000 (N2000), ‘’the center piece of EU nature and biodiversity policy‘’ (IUCN 2014), 
is an environmental protection regime articulated by the EU as a network of protected areas. The 
network covers over 18% of the EU’s land area (EC, 2016b). The largest coordinated network of 
protected areas in the world aims to ensure the long-term protection of Europe's most valuable 
and threatened species and habitats. However, N2000 is not a system of strict nature reserves from 
which all human activities would be excluded. While it includes strictly protected nature reserves, 
most of the land remains subject of human activities. The pan-European environmental 
conservation network represents a novel governance mode: it replaces the outdated adage of the 
‘fortress conservation’ approaches ‘’people or nature’’ with an imperative ‘’people and nature’’. 
Thus, public participation in the governance of the N2000 sites is an indelible component of the 
N2000 governance approach. The former European Commissioner for the Environment, Margot 
Wallström has admitted: ‘’To be successful [Natura 2000] requires, in the first instance, the active 
involvement of the people who live in and depend upon these areas’’. The statement follows from 
the so-called ‘’Aarhus Convention’’ - the UN/ECE Convention on access to information, public 
participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters – of which the EU 
is a signatory since the 25th of June 1998. Linking environmental rights and human the Convention 
posits that sustainable development can be achieved only through the involvement of all 
stakeholders. 
The legislative kernel of N2000 are the Birds Directive (2009/147/EC) and the Habitats 
Directive (92/43/EEC). The EU refers to these directives as the “two pillars of EU nature legislation” 
(EC, 2016a).  
The Birds Directive aims to protect all of the 500 wild bird species naturally occurring in 
the EU. Europe is home to more than 500 wild bird species, yet the conservation status of at least 
32% of the EU's bird species is currently unsatisfactory. Member States unanimously adopted the 
Directive 79/409/EEC in April 1979. It is the oldest piece of EU legislation on the environment and 
one of its cornerstones. Amended in 2009, it became the Directive 2009/147/EC, designating 
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Special Protection Areas (SPAs) classified under Article 4 of the birds directive (Council Directive 
79/409/EEC of 2 April 1979 on the conservation of wild birds). 
The Habitats Directive ensures the conservation of a wide range of rare, threatened or 
endemic animal and plant species. Adopted in 1992, the Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 
1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora aims to promote the 
maintenance of biodiversity, taking account of economic, social, cultural and regional 
requirements. In order to counter the loss of habitat, the Directive establishes a network of Special 
Area of Conservation (SAC) sites. Since 1994, all SPAs are included in the N2000 ecological network, 
set up under the Habitats Directive 92/43/EEC. 
From a governance perspective, Natura 2000 integrates scientific, economic, and societal 
criteria with the aim of overcoming the limitations of traditional, top-down, science-based, and 
nation state–centred conservation systems (Alphandery and Fortier 2001). This is particularly 
relevant, as the focus of Natura 2000 is not only on so-called pristine nature but also on semi-
natural territories such as farmlands, forests, and grasslands, which are managed in traditional 
and sustainable ways (EC 2008). Moreover, Natura 2000 refers to the need for consulting affected 
societal stakeholders for the management of the protected sites. This suggests that Natura 2000 
involves multiple rationales and objectives, including science-based conservation and 
stakeholder participation (Turnhout et. al., 2015, 461). Scholars agree that Natura 2000 has started 
with a technocratic approach that has privileged conservation experts and marginalised socio-
economic stakeholders (Ferranti et. al. 2014, Turnhout et. al., 2015). However, the evolution of the 
regime has introduced participatory and economic approaches that offer scope for the inclusion 
of a wider range of stakeholders. 
The IUCN reports that the economic benefits of the N2000 network have been estimated 
at between 200 and 300 billion euros per year, or 2-3% of the EU’s Gross Domestic Product (IUCN 
2016). Economic activities undertaken in N2000 sites are estimated to have supported about 12 
million jobs each year during the period 2006-2008 (i.e. about 6% of total employment in the EU). 
At the same time the programme has been instrumental in protecting natural environments from 
short-term economic and political decisions. The IUCN considers it to be “a cause for celebration 
in Europe and one of the success stories” (IUCN 2014). 
N2000: institutional context 
N2000 has been introduced into a setting, characterized by a significant institutional 
complexity. The EU is a complex institutional and political actor, active in a broad range of policy 
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domains. In conceptual terms, the EU can be defined as a multi-level, multi-actor system of 
governance involving EU institutions and Member States as constitutive units. The rules and 
regulations governing European environmental policy bear the imprint of EU’s complex 
institutional structure. Several different actors are involved in environmental policymaking: the 
Member States, the Council, the European Commission (EC), the European Court of Justice (ECJ), 
the European Parliament (EP) as well as various civil society and business groups (Afionis 2013). 
Each important actor within this long policy chain is a veto point, and any actor promoting a 
particular goal must build consensus and compromise across all the veto points (Weale, 1996). 
Consequently, the sheer complexity of the EU institutional process limits the influence of less 
organized and knowledgeable environmental actors (Zito, 2005, 366). 
The European institution most directly concerned with the conservation of the European 
environment is the Environment Directorate General (DG) of the European Commission ('DG 
Environment'). Established in 1973 DG Environment’s broad institutional mandate is ‘’to protect, 
preserve and improve the European environment for present and future generations’’ (DG 
Environment, 2015). In the sphere of environmental conservation DG Environment has diverse 
capacities, ranging from policy-making to assistance in policy implementation and evaluation. 
Thus, the Commission (as represented by DG Environment) not only proposes policies and 
legislation that protect natural habitats, but also provides a certain assistance to their legislative 
and policy implementation as well as monitoring to ensure that the member states apply the EU 
environmental law correctly. In cases of lack of clarity in the interpretation of the environmental 
legislation or non-compliance with the agreed-upon legislation, the Commission follows up on 
complaints from citizens and non-governmental organisations and may bring the matter to the 
ECJ. 
Yet transposing the EU legislation into the 28 different legal realms of its member states is 
a considerable challenge and inevitably often results in confusion and differences in the 
interpretation2. In case of dispute or diverging views, it rests with the ECJ to provide definitive 
interpretation of a Directive and the Court’s rulings on nature conservation provide an important 
case-law. Even though the rulings are accessible to the public, already in the year 2006 the ECJ 
admitted that “their number [of court rulings] is growing and it is sometimes quite complicated to 
the persons not directly working as lawyers to find and extract the most important parts regarding 
2 Ladislav Miko, а former Director of the Protection of Natural Resources, DG Environment admits: ‘’From my 
numerous discussions at various levels of implementation – in national Parliaments, national and regional 
Governments, but also in daily contacts with concerned stakeholders – landowners, industries, citizens, 
environmental and other NGO’s etc. - it appears that understanding and interpretation of European 
directives often varies’’ (EC, 2006, 4). 
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specific interpretation of European law” (EC, 2006, 4). Thus, although the goal of the ECJ rulings 
has been ‘’foreseen to be a daily tool to clarify the legal basis of EU provisions in the Nature 
protection area and avoid misunderstandings in their implementation in advance – before the real 
problem appears’’ (EC, 2006, 4), it is becoming too hard and complex to interpret this growing body 
of rulings outside the legal realm. 
Consequently, in the domestic sphere of transposition and implementation of European 
conservation governance there is an emerging tension between legislative complexity and the 
necessary democratic accessibility of the law to the public understanding. The complexity of the 
legislation clearly has a negative impact on the capacity of the regular European citizens to 
understand and act in accordance with the N2000 legislation, as is illustrated by a review, 
conducted by the UK Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs (DEFRA). 
In 2012 DEFRA conducted a review of the implementation of the Habitats and Birds 
Directives in the UK and of their impact. The review offers a critical perspective of the high 
complexity of the transposed Directives and the corresponding guidelines, which has resulted in a 
lack of transparency and understanding by the implementing authorities and regular citizens 
alike. DEFRA states: 
“Transposing terrestrial regulations alone covering approximately 134 regulations 
and 7 schedules over 94 pages, and guidance (EU and National and non-
Government) amounts to over 60 documents totalling over 1,600 pages. This can 
be difficult for competent authorities to navigate and is all the more daunting for 
developers, large and small. It also reinforces a perception of inconsistency and 
lack of transparency in the process”. (DEFRA 2012, p.13) 
Clearly, legal transparency has been identified as a major concern by DEFRA and 
considerations of the issues of accessibility and transparency of the N2000 legal framework have 
become subjects of significant concern. 
It is recognized that communication about legislation is itself a complex social and political 
process. However an improvement in the way in which legislation is presented, made available 
and explained could dramatically reduce the perception of disproportionate complexity (BRTF, 
2015). The European citizens should not experience difficulty in accessing reliable, clear 
information on their rights and duties, combined with a lack of guidance on the compliance 
requirements relevant to them and their specific circumstances. Moreover, since N2000 explicitly 
aims at integrating the European citizens in the design and implementation of the conservation 
policy and praxis, it is imperative that the legislation is accessible to them. 
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Consequently, contrary to some legal arguments for more ‘classic’ legal approaches and 
‘hard law’, the success of such wide-ranging and important pan-European conservation initiatives 
does not depend on more codification and on the implementation of more stringent practices of 
enforcement and the administration of justice along the hierarchical command-and-control 
governance style, but on generating wide levels of social support via the endorsement of a palette 
of new legislative and non-legislative instruments. Instead of ‘more classic regulation’, a mix of 
alternative and less prescriptive legal and non-legal tools in addition to the traditional legal 
instruments provides room for flexibility as well as speeds up the implementation process. The EU 
has made efforts to design and implement exactly such flexible and accessible guidelines and 
explanatory documents. Amongst the most innovative and successful such tools are the N2000 
awards. 
The N2000 awards: governance innovation and social learning within and beyond the European 
borders 
The European N2000 annual awards are a pan-European recognition of excellence in the 
management of N2000 sites and conservation achievements (EC, 2016c). The awards trace their 
beginning to 2012, and the winning entries have been publicly shared since 2014. With the awards 
the Commission showcases the added value of N2000 for the local economies and at the same 
time it increases the public awareness about Europe's valuable natural heritage (EC, 2016c). 
Communication with the European public about the goals of N2000 is explicitly stated as 
the primary purpose of the awards – thereby strengthening the Commission’s public outreach and 
educating the public about N2000. The awards recognize ‘good practices at Natura 2000 sites in 
five different categories: Communication, Socio-Economic Benefits, Conservation, Reconciling 
Interests/Perceptions, and Cross-border Cooperation and Networking. Since 2015 the host of 
awards also includes a European Citizens’ Award, which gives the public a chance to vote directly 
for their favourite finalist. The Commission aims to attract the widest possible range of 
stakeholders as applicants to the award: ‘anyone directly involved in Natura 2000 – businesses, 
authorities, NGOs, volunteers, land owners, educational institutions or individuals’. Thus, the 
award represents a novel attempt to strengthen the capacity of the local stakeholders to develop 
and implement effective environmental and natural resource management strategies and 
practices. One of the most prominent goals of the N2000 awards is promoting training activities 
and exchange experiences of the concepts, methodologies, mechanisms, and tools for effective 
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environmental management, as well as the development of strategies to promote good 
environmental governance. The impact of the award is magnified by the additional support 
provided by the Commission to the award winners in organizing local events and giving them an 
added opportunity to showcase their achievements. 
The awards also raise the profile of the EU as an international biodiversity conservation 
actor. Although the conditions of the N2000 awards do not allow the direct participation of 
applicants from non-EU member-states as principal award applicants, states from the European 
neighbourhood routinely participate in the collaborative awarded projects. The collaborative social 
learning, which this participation entails, allows spreading of the best conservation practices 
through the international informal networks of environmental scientists, activists and concerned 
citizens’ groups. Thus, the efforts of the EC to find novel ways of communicating directly with the 
European citizens reverberate far beyond the formal boundaries of the EU, finding receptive 
international audiences. 
The EU as a successful institutional international conservation actor 
Regardless of its internal challenges and complexities, the European Union (EU) is a 
prominent actor in the institutionalized practices of global sustainable environmental governance 
(Vogler, 2005; Bretherton and Vogler 2006; Schreurs, and Tiberghien, 2007; Vanden Brande, 2008, 
Kilian and Elgström, 2010). The analysis will now present the most important international 
conservation initiatives, which the EU is formally involved with. The presentation will be followed 
by a discussion, reflecting on the theoretical constructs of the role of the EU as an international 
biodiversity conservation actor. 
The EU is a Party to the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) of 1992, 
which seeks to ensure the conservation and sustainable use of the global biodiversity. In 2010, CBD 
Parties adopted a 10-year Strategic Plan to address global biodiversity loss; the plan was 
accompanied by the setting of 20 concrete targets (the Aichi targets) in order to achieve its overall 
objective. That same year, the Parties also adopted the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic 
Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from Their Utilization. The EU has 
also supported and contributed to the development of the 2015 UN 17 Sustainable Development 
Goals, and 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. 
Furthermore, the Council of Europe’s Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife 
and Natural Habitats, or Bern Convention (1982), was the first international treaty to protect both 
species and habitats and to bring countries together to decide how to act on nature conservation. 
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The Bern Convention is a binding international legal instrument, covering most of the natural 
heritage of the European continent and extending to some States of Africa. Fifty countries and the 
EU have currently signed up to the Convention and committed to promoting national conservation 
policies, considering the impact of planning and development on the natural environment, 
promoting education and information on conservation, and coordinating research. 
The EU has also implemented a broad range of other biodiversity-related international 
agreements such as CITES (the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species), the 
Bonn Convention on Migratory Species (CMS), the Bonn Convention on Migratory Species (CMS) as 
well as the Agreement on international humane trapping standards. 
Moreover, the EU has made an important contribution to the challenges of sustainable 
environmental governance and conservation, as one of the major donors for protected areas 
overseas through the EU’s development aid programmes (IUCN 2014). The European Community 
and its Member States account for more than half of worldwide Official Development Assistance 
(ODA). 
Evidently the EU’s impact on the global biodiversity conservation issues is very significant. 
Recently, it has become even more pronounced, since the EU has also played an important role in 
the development of the Emerald Network (COE 2015). The Emerald Network programme was 
established in 1989 by the Council of Europe as part of its activities in the implementation of the 
Bern Convention, with the adoption of Recommendation No. 16 (1989) of the Standing Committee 
to the Convention (CoE, 2012). The Network is based on the same principles as Natura 2000. The 
Emerald Network represents a de facto N2000 extension to non-EU countries; while in the EU 
Member States, the Emerald Network is identical to N2000. For EU candidate countries, the 
network represents the phase of preparation for- and a direct contribution to- the implementation 
of the N2000 programme. The Council of Europe explicitly states the goal as ‘to keep the Emerald 
and N2000 Networks as coherent as possible’ (CoE 2012, p.8). 
As demonstrated by the discussion: the EU is not only an active participant in the existing 
international conservation efforts, but also an initiator in the establishment of new such initiatives. 
Of the four international environmental governance roles of the EU identified by Zito (2005): 
Negotiator, Innovator, Market and Model (to emulate), the analysis highlights the ones of the 
Innovator and Model as most directly applicable to the global influence of the N2000 
environmental conservation model. N2000 is a governance innovation, establishing a novel 
inclusive and participatory biodiversity conservation governance mode. Thus, the EU acts as an 
Innovator both by adopting this new mode of governance, and by extending efforts to expand the 
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network internationally – via the Emerald Network initiative. Moreover, very closely inter-linked 
with the Innovator role of the EU is also the role of the Model (to emulate). 
Consequently, N2000 and the Emerald Network also represent an example of EU’s 
directional leadership. EU leads by example in the implementation of N2000 as a policy and 
governance model, across a range of different political and administrative settings. N2000 also 
represents an ideas-based leadership, impacting the international policy agendas by extending its 
governance principles via the Emerald Network, and consequently naming and framing the 
conservation issues, setting the agenda and discovering and proposing joint solutions to the 
collective problems. 
Conclusions 
N2000 does not resolve, but embodies the tensions of the European institutional 
arrangements, laws and policies. Among the most significant of these tensions is the search for 
balance between traditional ‘classic regulation’ and emerging legal and non-legal alternatives. 
The enforcement of EU legislation is primarily the responsibility of the national institutions, so 
capacity-building at the national level is essential, yet in itself, without a certain institutional 
transformation which endorses a wider set of instruments, it would be insufficient to achieve the 
ambitious conservation objectives. A judicious mix of classic regulation and alternatives would 
benefit from the advantages of both approaches and carries the potential of enhancing the 
democratic legitimacy of the EU. 
The EU is a complex governance system that poses both challenges and opportunities. 
However, paradoxically, the internal tensions accompanying EU’s governance actions in the 
sphere of environmental conservation could contribute to its standing as a global environmental 
leader. EU’s current complex institutional system is underpinned by a constant imperative to 
develop variety of innovative policy responses. The current analysis especially supports the 
argument that the roles of Innovator and Model, providing directional leadership and ideas-based 
leadership offer a particularly promising way forward for the achievement of the global 
conservation objectives. 
EU’s role as a leader in environmental conservation and sustainable development does not 
depend on dismissing the tensions attendant to the policies’ development and implementation, 
but on using them as an impetus for continued governance innovation. Only by adopting such 
stance will the EU be able to face the challenge of inspiring people around the world and across 
generations to reconnect with nature, ‘by demonstrating that genuine sustainable development is 
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possible’ (IUCN 2014). 
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Role of Energy-Competition Law in accelerating the ASEAN Energy Sustainability 2025 
Dian Parluhutan1 
Introduction 
In the year 2015, the leaders of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Member 
States (AMS) have introduced two new regional cooperation schemes: the ASEAN Economic 
Community (AEC) Blueprint 2025 and the ASEAN Community Vision 2025.  
AEC Blueprint 2025 founded upon five interrelated and mutually reinforcing pillars: First, a 
highly integrated and cohesive economy. Second, competitive, innovative, and dynamic ASEAN. 
Third, enhanced connectivity and sectoral cooperation. Fourth, a resilient, inclusive, people-
oriented, and people-centred ASEAN, and; fifth, a global ASEAN.  
Previously, by virtue of the ASEAN Concord II declared in Bali, Indonesia, in 2003, the ASEAN 
Countries have agreed to establish AEC by 2015, aiming not only to transform ASEAN into a region 
with free flow of capital, movement of goods, services, investment and skilled labour, but also to a 
highly competitive region that is fully integrated with the global economy. 
The provision of Article 1(5) of AEC Charter mandates not only the ASEAN single market but 
also setting the culture of competition. It can be seen from the words “... highly competitive and 
economically integrated with…”. The words "highly competitive" asserts that in carrying out ASEAN 
single market, a culture of competition must be created. In this regard, Sivalingam is of opinion that 
there are three principal factors catalysing economic integration under the AEC framework. First, 
the processes towards a market economy due to the growing integration of ASEAN’s economies with 
global economies and domestic upheavals. Second, the proliferation of Multi-National-Enterprises 
(MNEs), which engage in generating goods and services and at the same time penetrating the South 
East Asian markets through their products. Third, institutional consequences of the Membership of 
ASEAN Countries in the World Trade Organization (WTO)2. 
In 2014, during the ASEAN Ministers Energy Meeting (AMEM), all ten ASEAN states leaders 
agreed on implementing the new ASEAN Plan of Action for Energy Cooperation (APAEC) for 2016-
2015, in the purposes of “Enhancing Energy Connectivity and Market Integration in ASEAN to 
Achieve Energy Security, Accessibility, Affordability and Sustainability for All” (ASEAN 2015, p.1). 
Whilst the APAEC envisages six fundamental objective areas, three thereof are primarily important 
1 PhD candidate, Faculty of Law, Freie Universität Berlin; dian.parluhutan@fu-berlin.de   
2 Currently, eight of the ASEAN Countries are WTO members: Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, 
Brunei, Malaysia, Cambodia, and Myanmar. The other ASEAN members, Laos and Vietnam, are now 
negotiating membership. See http://www.wto.org/membership [accessed on 07.03.2016]. 
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in the context of this paper, namely: energy efficiency and conversation, new and renewable energy 
sources, and regional energy policy and environmental analysis (Ibid). 
Nevertheless, in the ASEAN’s energy sector, pervasive anticompetitive and unfair business 
practices have been impending the attainment of the ASEAN’s sustainable energy objectives. 
Specifically, there have been uncompetitive structures under state owned enterprise (SOE) 
monopoles. Put differently, up to now there are, inter alia, three main obstacles establishing 
competition in the energy sector in ASEAN countries: structural separation (unbundling), access to 
essential facilities, and privatization (Wisuttisak 2012). 
Objectives 
Accordingly, this paper attempts to analyse and provide feasible solutions concerning the 
role of energy-competition law in creating the competitive market of the energy sector in ASEAN, as 
well as in accelerating the ASEAN energy sustainability objective’s realization abovementioned.  
Hence, this paper continues as follows. Following the research background and problems 
introduced above, the paper describes the energy sustainability objectives of the AMS, envisaged to 
be realized in the year of 2020-2025. Subsequently, an analysis concerning the roles of energy-
competition law in establishing the competitive market of energy sectors and in accelerating the 
ASEAN energy sustainability objective’s realization is provided. The paper continues by discussing 
the juridical approximation of energy-competition law in the AMS in the light of the AEC’s goals and 
ASEAN energy sustainability objectives. The analysis takes into account the juridical comparative 
method with the German, United Kingdom (UK) and European Union (EU)’s energy-competition 
regulations. Eventually, the concluding part endeavours to provide feasible solutions concerning 
the energy competition’s regulatory framework in the light of the AEC’s and ASEAN energy 
sustainability’s objectives, taking into account the economic integration in the multilateral sphere 
(WTO).  
Discussion  
Principally, the energy law pursues following key objectives, which are: First, the 
sustainability and reliability of the energy supply, both short-technical and long-term energy 
supplies. Second, operation of energy supplies shall not counter environmental protection 
objectives (i.e. every undertaking shall minimalize the occurrences of damages to the environment 
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as well as to humans’ health: CO2 emissions reduction). Third, to eradicate and to prevent restrictive 
practices to competition in an energy sector, whereas these measures aim to enable every 
undertaking to set competitive prices for energy supplies (Konzept des wettbewerbsanalogen 
Preises; Konzept der Kosten der effizienten Leistungserbringung; billigem Ermessen). Fourth, 
providing sophisticated rules concerning contracts of energy supplies between corporations, which 
are aimed to benefit consumers and achieve compliance with modern equitable competition rules.  
Specifically, the energy-competition law focuses upon primary concerns as follows: First, a 
high energy market concentration especially at the wholesale level. Second, a vertical foreclosure 
due to an insufficient level of unbundling between network operation vis-à-vis supply and/or 
generation activities. Third, an insufficient cross-border capacities and different market designs 
constituting an obstacle of further market integration. Fourth, lacks of efficient and transparent 
price formation and “information asymmetry between incumbents and market entrants”. Fifth, long 
contract durations and restrictive practices in relation to supply contracts causing foreclosure of 
downstream markets. Sixth, regarding balancing markets, the energy-competition law addresses 
the concern of balancing regimes in favour of incumbents and creating barriers to new entrants in 
the energy sector.  
With regard to ASEAN energy sustainability, the energy-competition law consists of an array 
of rules which are playing two main roles. First, an intrinsic role, which means the eradicating 
anticompetitive practices and unfair business ones in the energy market. According to Schmidt, 
there are mainly three types of anticompetitive practices (Schmidt 2005, pp.122-125): First, the 
negotiating strategy (Verhandlungsstrategie), which refers to legal restrictions over competition-
relevant conduct and/or decision relating to the one or several action parameters due to the 
collusive agreements, decisions of association of undertakings and concerted practices (Schmidt 
2005, p.121). Second, the obstruction or impediment strategy (Behinderungsstrategie). This 
strategy means de jure or de facto restraints over competition-relevant conduct and/or decision 
related to the one or several action parameters due to the obstruction against rival undertakings 
(competitors) through agreements (tying/coupling contract) or de facto market conducts 
(discrimination, boycott, refusals to supply) (Ibid). Third, the concentration or conglomeration 
strategy (Konzentrationsstrategie).  This strategy defined as factual restrictions over competition-
relevant conduct and/or decision relating to the one or several action parameters due to the cutting 
of quantity (numbers) of competition policy’s decision makers through external or over 
proportionally internal corporate growth (Ibid). 
The second main role of the ASEAN energy competition law in regard to achieving 
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sustainability is extrinsic one, which means the law will promote the energy market integration in 
ASEAN by ensuring the free movement of goods, services, investment, skilled-labour, and freer flow 
of capital within ASEAN members. According to Mestmäcker and Schweitzer (1974 / 2014), these five 
freedoms together with a competition law are to be seen as the constituting factors of a market 
economy in a regional economic integration, such as in the ASEAN.  
Nevertheless, according to the World Bank and ASEAN Competition Law scholars there is an 
urgent necessity to accomplish the legislative convergence of energy-competition laws in AMS. Per 
definitionem, the convergence of energy-competition rules are the processes whereby several 
nations or group of nations collectively decide to adopt identical, or at least compatible, rules and 
normative principles in one or several regulatory areas, notably energy-competition aspect (World 
Bank 2014). Accordingly, there are two types of law convergence, which are: a “loose” convergence 
where one or several countries decide to rely upon common normative principle in one regulatory 
aspect, yet the details on how to achieve compliance are given to national laws. For examples United 
Nations (UN) Model Laws and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD)’s Law Recommendation. The second type is “deep” convergence whereas the involved 
countries decide to approximate divergent legal standards for facilitating free trade arrangements.  
Related to these two types and equally important, the World Bank (2014) recommends the 
following approaches as to legislative convergence of energy-competition laws. First, the regulatory 
“transplant” form, whereas one of several involved countries decide to transpose in its domestic 
legal system one or several set(s) of competition rules from another nation. For instance, 
transposition of the acquis communautaire for acceding countries into the European Union (EU). 
Second, “approximation”, in which concerned countries negotiate a common set of rules and then 
adjust their domestic competition regulations as to make them compatible with the common 
(regional) regulations (e.g. implementation of the EU directives [Richtlinie]). 
Nevertheless, the legislative convergence of energy-competition laws in the ASEAN has been 
obstructed by certain roadblocks. Evidently, Kokkoris argued that the harmonisation of energy-
competition laws in the ASEAN suffers from the following drawbacks: a lack in supranational law-
making body for legislating and enforcing community laws; regardless of three decades of close 
cooperation, the ASEAN governmental leaders have repeatedly refused proposals of 
supranationality in South East Asia; the Community Law regulating energy-competition, which is 
truly supranational, has been absent; there has been no community rules which are ‘neutral’ from 
cultural sensitivities of the AMS, and; lastly, the legal systems in AMS differ greatly, varying from the 
common law, civil law and hybrids of the both.  
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In contrast, Thanadsillapakul argued for another alternative of the harmonisation of energy-
competition laws. According to his argument, three options are available: First, the coordinated or 
the sovereignty model, whereas the AMS can rely upon the coordinated application of national 
competition laws based on positive agreements. Second, the harmonised model, whereby the AMS 
can harmonise their energy-competition laws following international guidelines. Third, the 
supranationality model, which involves the highest degree of collaboration in a form of an 
agreement on international competition laws. Accordingly, Thanadsillapakul arguably insisted that 
the harmonised model is the most suitable for the ASEAN countries. 
Conclusions 
Eventually, embarking upon the discourses abovementioned, key conclusions can be 
inferred as follows: Firstly, due to prerequisite physical and institutional connectivity, as the first and 
second pillars of the ASEAN Economic Integration, the existence and optimal implementation of the 
Energy-Competition Law in ASEAN, accordingly, is of profoundly important. This is in order not only 
to accelerate the AEC achievement but also to serve as key nexus between physical and institutional 
ASEAN connectivity, in particular within the sustainable energy policy.  
Nevertheless, the construction and implementation of the energy-competition law should 
take into accounts the macro and micro principles prudently notably related to the sustainability of 
energy provisions and green (environmentally-friendly) energy such as solar and geothermal 
sources. Second, a series of substantial provisions should be prudently incorporated into the 
energy-competition law in ASEAN, most importantly the guarantee of efficient and transparent 
prices and fees for all stakeholders in the energy provision services. Thirdly, the optimal and 
substantial implementation of the energy-competition law in ASEAN however requires the common 
commitment and endeavours of AMS, in order to conduct comprehensive yet accelerated positive 
integration by means of legislative approximations in the domain of energy provision services. As a 
matter of fact, all of these envisaged programmes are to foster future challenges and consistent 
synergies to achieve partnership in dynamic development which will forge closer economic 
integration within the ASEAN Countries.  
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A sustainable approach to controling Varroa mite, a parasite of honey bees 
Nurit Eliash1 2, Kumar Nitin Singh 1, Yosef Kamer 1, Ilya Zaidman 1, Erika Plettner3 and Victoria 
Soroker 1 
Abstract 
Varroa destructor  (Acari: Varroidae) is a parasitic mite specific to honey bees (Apis sp.) and 
one of the major threats to apiculture (bees maintenance of hives) today. The chemical control in 
use is harmful to the bees and accumulates in the hive products. Furthermore, there are growing 
evidences for inefficiency of Varroa control measures due to resistance development. In the light 
of the recent world pollinator decline, the ecological and economical significance of honey bee 
health should be of a major concern. Chemical signals from the bees are known to play a major 
role in the mite's host detection and allows Varroa to distinguish between bees from different task 
groups and prefer a nurse over a forager bee. Our approach is to interfere in the parasite-host 
interaction via disruption of the mite’s host finding behavior. In search for a specific disruptive 
compound, we developed a method to study the chemosensing of Varroa. We tested the effect of 
potent synthetic compounds on the Varroa chemosensory organ located on its foreleg by 
electrophysiology. The effect of active compounds on Varroa host selection behavior was tested 
in a choice bioassay. The disruptive compounds were further tested for possible toxicity to bees, 
as these compounds are intended to be used in the hive. We found that in the presence of some 
compounds, the response of Varroa chemosensory organ to honey bee headspace volatiles 
significantly decreased. This effect was accompanied by a profound change in the mite's host 
selection behavior. These results open new venues for a sustainable control of this major honey 
bee pest. 
Introduction 
Varroa destructor Anderson & Trueman (Acari: Varroidae) is an ectoparasitic mite of honey 
bees, originally found in the Eastern honey bee Apis cerana. A shift to the European honey bee Apis 
mellifera, which lacks the characteristics of its original host, has led to an unbalanced host- 
1 Correspondent author, Department of Entomology, Institute of Plant Protection, Agricultural 
Research Organization, Volcani Center, Bet Dagan, Israel; norikachan@gmail.com  
2 Institute of Agroecology and Plant Health, Robert H. Smith Faculty of Agriculture, Food and Environment, 
Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Rehovot, Israel 
3 Department of Chemistry, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, B. C., Canada 
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parasite relationship and to devastating damage to honey bee colonies. Today, the Varroa has 
spread almost all over the world and is considered to be the most significant threat to beekeeping 
(Rosenkranz et al. 2010; Nazzi and Le Conte 2016). Without conventional routine treatments an 
infested hive will not accumulate adequate amount of honey (Currie and Gatien 2006) and will not 
effectively pollinate crops. Eventually, the colony will collapse within one-two years without 
proper treatment (Francis et al. 2013). 
The significance of honey bees to both agricultural crop-pollination and nature 
biodiversity has been widely reviewed. Bees and honey bees in particular, constitute the main 
pollinating insect worldwide (Kevan & Viana 2003). Out of 115 leading global food commodities, 52 
depend on honey bee pollination for fruit or seed set (Klein et al. 2007). Honey bee pollination is 
beneficial directly or indirectly for 35% of human diet, and its value is estimated at 212 billion US$ 
(Gallai et al. 2009). In addition to their crucial role as agricultural pollinators, honey bees also are 
important to biodiversity conservation as they are positively correlated to plant diversity and 
pollinator diversity (Paudel et al. 2015). These data are of serious weight in the light of the recent 
decline of honey bees and other pollinating–insects’ populations. Worldwide evidences show 
losses of honey bee colonies in the US (~30%), Europe (1.8-53%), Middle East (10-85%), and Japan 
(25%) (Carreck and Neumann 2010). It is important to clarify that these losses are not unusual and 
have been reported a few times in the last century (vanEngelsdorp and Meixner 2010), and that the 
overall number of honey bee hives have increased by ~45% since 1961; However, the agricultural 
crops area depending on honey bee pollination is increasing in higher numbers (>300%), leaving 
an overgrowing gap (Aizen and Harder 2009). Varroa mite and its associated viruses is the most 
dominant factor correlated with these losses (Carreck and Neumann 2010; Le Conte et al. 2010; 
Dennis and Kemp 2016). 
The mite is harming honey bees in many ways both directly and indirectly. It feeds upon 
the hemolymph (“blood”) of the bee, leading to a reduced weight and life span of the emerging 
adult bee (Bowen-Walker and Gunn 2001). In addition, it was reported to cause neurological 
damage, reduction in flight ability and non-associative learning (Kralj and Fuchs 2006; Kralj et al. 
2007). Moreover, the mite’s parasitism weakens the honey bee immune system, increasing its 
sensitivity to pathogens (Nazzi et al. 2012; Di Prisco et al. 2016). However, the main damage that 
leads eventually to the collapse of the hive is probably via the viruses that it vectors (Yang and Cox-
Foster 2005; De Miranda et al. 2011). 
Varroa control is based on chemical pesticides including Pyrethroids and Organic 
Phosphorus compounds. Not only these chemicals are harming the bees, but also their residues 
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accumulate in the bees' products, such as bee wax, honey and pollen, which are intensively used 
for human consumption, medicine and cosmetics (Bogdanov et al. 1999; Tsigouri and 
Menkissoglu–Spiroudi 2003; Çobanoğlu et al. 2008). Finally, there are worldwide growing 
evidences for mite's resistance towards these chemicals (Milani 1999; Elzen et al. 2000; Thompson 
et al. 2003; Strachecka et al. 2015). 
It is now understood that, like in other fields of agriculture, also in apiculture in-hive 
pesticides are not the answer to sustainable honey bee health maintenance. Therefore, an 
integrated approach to Varroa control has been advocated. In spite of a world wide effort to solve 
Varroa problem, efficient remedies are yet to be found. Thus, the objective of our study was to 
identify new potential Varroa control agents, in particular those disrupting bee recognition by the 
Varroa mite. 
The Varroa life cycle is well synchronized with that of the honey bee and can be generally 
divided into two main phases: a phoretic phase, in which the Varroa parasitizes an adult bee, and 
a reproductive phase, in which it reproduces within the sealed brood cell (Martin 2001). The 
invasion into the brood cell is mediated by a nurse bee which carries the mite to the cell entrance 
(Boot et al. 1995). Nurse bees are the younger bees in the hive which nursing the bee larva inside 
the hive; while forager bees are older bees which forage outside the hive for nectar and pollen in 
flowers. As the synchronization between the Varroa and the bee life cycles appears to be the key 
for Varroa success (Kraus 1994; Pernal et al. 2005), a specific disruption of the Varroa host finding 
behavior seems as a reasonable approach for its management, without harming the bees. Varroa 
do not have eyes or antennae and their host detection mainly depends on the sense of smell (Rickli 
1992; Del Piccolo et al. 2010). The major olfactory organ of the Varroa sensing the bee volatiles is 
concentrated in a pit organ located on each of its forelegs (Eliash et al. 2014). 
Materials and Methods 
Over twenty chemicals, most of which were originally developed for disruption of sexual 
communication in Lepidoptera 4  (Akhtar et al. 2007), were tested and evaluated by 
electrophysiological (EAG) and behavioral bioassays for Varroa mite, and toxicity bioassay for 
honey bees. EAG assay was developed on the isolated foreleg of female Varroa mite (figure 1). This 
unique organ contains sensory organ that consists of nine internal sensilla and nine long hair 
surrounding sensilla. Some of the sensilla (at least six) are wall-pored sensilla that bear similarity 
4 Order of insects (including, for example, moths and butterflies). 
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to the olfactory sensilla of other arthropods (figure 1). The foreleg was stimulated by puffs of 
honeybee odor, or a clean air (control) as shown in Figure 2A and C. The tested chemicals were 
blown with or without bee odor in the order seen in figure 2B. The response amplitude was 
recorded for each stimulus (Singh et al. 2014; Eliash et al. 2014). 
Figure 1. Scanning Electron Microscope (SEM) analysis. The picture shows the Varroa olfactory 
organ on its foreleg, and its wall-pore chemosensilla (source: Eliash 2012). 
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Figure 2. Electrophysiology with the Varroa foreleg. A. 
EAG setup of an isolated Varroa foreleg that was stimulated with the headspace volatiles of bees in 
a jar. B. Order of the Varroa foreleg stimulations and terminology used for the corresponding 
responses. The stimuli were: Air, Headspace of five nurse bees (Bee stimulus), Bee stimulus together 
with the compound (Bee stimulus + comp) or of the hexane control (Bee stimulus + hexane). C. 
Typical traces of Varroa foreleg responses to air (left) and honey bee volatiles (right). 
The effect of compounds on the behavior of female Varroa was tested by a choice assay in a 
glass arena (Figure 4A; Eliash et al. 2014). Briefly, the mite was given a choice of two bees (a forager 
and a nurse), in the presence of the tested compound or solvent (Hexane) as control. The Varroa 
host preference was assessed after 3 hours. A possible toxicity of the compounds to honey bees was 
tested as well. The mortality of adult honey bees was assessed in the presence of the disruptive 
compound or solvent (Hexane) as control. 
Twenty adult bees were kept in a small plastic cage with ventilation openings in controlled 
environment (28-30C˚, 50-70% RH), supplied with water and sugar candy (Medrzycki et al. 2013; 
Williams et al. 2013).  The number of dead bees was counted each day for 3 days. 
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Results and Discussion 
In this study we were able to show for the first time that the Varroa is sensing honey bee odor 
via its sensory organ located on its foreleg. In addition, the tested compounds inhibit the Varroa 
response to honey bee headspace and alter its host finding behavior. The effect apparently starts at 
the level of the sensory organ. Two effects were detected by the EAG assay: 1) Short-term inhibition: 
decrease in responses to honey bee headspace volatiles when the compound was given 
simultaneously, and 2) Long-term inhibition: decreased in response to the following stimulation by 
honey bee headspace volatiles. Figure 3 shows the responses acquired with two compounds: 
Cyclopent-2-en-1-alkoxy diether, cy{4,1} and a Dialkoxybenzene, 3b{2,2}. Both compounds showed 
a long term significant effect (Anova repeated measures followed by Tukey-Kramer post hoc tests, 
p<0.05, Fig 3). 
Following the EAG assay, a choice bioassay was performed to determine the effect of the 
compounds on the Varroa host selection. The results clearly show that most of the mites prefer a 
nurse over a forager bee in the control treatment (in the presence of hexane) (Goodness of fit, 
p<0.05, Fig 3). However, in the presence of cy{4,1} and 3b{2,2} the mites preference reversed, and the 
mites significantly preferred a forager to a nurse bee (Goodness of fit, p<0.05), while the total 
number of mites reaching a bee remained unchanged (Eliash et al. 2014). 
    UAS Spring Campus 2016 Conference Proceedings 
101 
Figure 3. Electrophysiological screening of the compounds. A. 
Order of the Varroa foreleg stimulations and terminology used for the corresponding responses. The 
stimuli were: Air, Headspace of five nurse bees (Bee stimulus), Bee stimulus together with the compound 
(Bee stimulus + comp) or of the hexane control (Bee stimulus + hexane). B. The effect of cy{4,1} and 3b{2,2} 
on the Varroa foreleg EAG response to bee headspace. (Normalized values against the response to air %, 
average + SE) (n = 10). Anova repeated measures followed by Tukey-Kramer post hoc tests. Bars marked 
by different letters are significantly different, p < 0.05, (n = 7-9). 
Figure 4. The effect of cy{4,1} and 3b{2,2} on Varroa host choice between a nurse and a forager bee. 
A. Experimental setup: One mite was placed between a nurse and forager bees. B. Effect of cy{4,1} 
and 3b{2,2}: Data are the percentage of viable Varroa 180 min from the beginning of the experiment 
in the presence of hexane (control) or 10ug of the tested compound. Numbers above the bars show
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the number of Varroa choosing a host. Red *- significant preference for a nurse bee; Blue * -
significant preference for a forager bee; Goodness of fit, p<0.05. 
The EAG and behavioral active compounds were further investigated for a possible effect on 
bee mortality. No significant bee mortality was found over the course of the experiment for both 
compound cy{4,1} (Anova repeated measures, F(1,1) = 0.63, p>0.05) and 3b{2,2} (F(1,1) = 0.64, 
p>0.05), in comparison to control (Hexane) (Fig 5).
Figure 5. Honey bee mortality in the presence of the disruptive compounds or Hexane (control). The 
number of dead bees was counted each day for 3 days. Anova repeated measures, p>0.05. 
The mode of action of these compounds on the Varroa is still unknown, but currently under 
study in our laboratory. Moreover, not much information exists on the structure and function of 
olfactory machinery in mites. Theoretically, the EAG inhibiting compounds can interfere with any of 
the events prior to the activation of a sensory neuron. The first stage at which the compound may 
interfere is the interaction between the Odorant binding protein and the natural odorant. Such 
interference has been proposed for similar compounds that slow the EAG recovery rate in gypsy 
moths (Gong and Plettner 2011). The next stage would be the interaction of the odorant with its 
respective receptor, along with ion channel opening or closing. The last stage would be the recovery 
of the system by the action of arrestin (Merrill et al. 2002) and ion pumps (Zimmermann 1992); 
reviewed by Plettner and Gries (2010). 
In summary, the present study provides evidence for disruption of Varroa host selection by 
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inhibiting its host sensing. The synthetic compounds were found to have a specific disruptive effect 
on Varroa mite while no effect on bees' survival, thus making it relatively safe to use in hive. The 
interference in mite's natural nurse preference could prolong the phoretic phase of the mite, making 
it more exposed to bees' hygienic behaviour and other "soft chemicals". Therefore, these findings 
are breakthrough for both basic sciences on mites chemosensing and sustainable apiculture. As the 
compounds are supposed to be implemented in the hive, a further study of their possible effect on 
honey bee chemical communication must be evaluated in the future. This study offers an innovative 
path to confront the mite by breaking the synchronization between the Varroa and the bee while 
not harming the bees. This approach is a promising step towards an integrated and sustainable 
control over this major apicultural pest. 
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The world’s forests play a substantial factor in balancing global carbon budget as well as 
influencing fluxes within other related carbon reservoirs. However, the world’s forests are being 
disappeared at a relatively rapid rate, as consequences of direct deforestation and climate-driven 
forest degradation (Bonan, 2008). Climate-driven forests decline is widely expected to increase in a 
warming world (Allen et al., 2010, Zhao &  Running, 2010). Physically, this is because hot air can hold 
more water vapour, increasing atmospheric evaporative demand and duration between 
consecutive precipitation events. This is likely to lead to increasing severity of floods and droughts. 
Ecologically, trees suffer heat stresses and potential water deprivation by heat-driven drought as 
temperature approaches and surpasses certain levels, resulting in drought-induced mortalities. 
Widespread tree mortality induced by recent heat waves and droughts has been, to this end, well 
documented with both modelling and observations (Allen et al., 2010, Van Mantgem et al., 2009, 
Williams et al., 2013, Yi et al., 2010).  
Report from Williams et al. (2013) modelling and FLUXNET data (a global network of 
micrometeorological flux measurement sites for carbon dioxide, water vapour and energy 
exchanges between biosphere and atmosphere) (Baldocchi et al., 2001) re-analysis is that the rate 
of transfer of atmospheric CO2 to soil is expected to decrease, thus resulting in further warming of 
the atmosphere and drying of forests. Drought-induced tree mortality has been shown to greatly 
reduce terrestrial carbon uptake (Zhao &  Running, 2010). However, the relationship between tree 
mortality and drought is reported to be more complex than that between grassland production and 
drought (Yi et al., 2012). This is thought to be mainly due to the greater ability of trees to access 
water sources at greater depths, leading to lower sensitivity to moisture levels in shallow soil 
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horizons. Therefore, quantitative determination of what level of available moisture is sufficient to 
induce drought-related tree mortality is challenging and critical to understanding the potential 
positive feedback to greater global warming. 
Research methods and results 
In this research (Kaicheng et al., 2015), we have evaluated the potential relationships 
between the level of tree growth and concurrent drought conditions, using the tree growth-related 
Ring Width Index (RWI) and the meteorological drought-related Standardized Precipitation 
Evapotranspiration Index (SPEI) (Vicente-Serrano et al., 2013) in the two dominant conifer species 
(Pinus edulis and Pinus ponderosa) in South Western United States (SWUS). In this effort, we 
determined the binned averages of RWI and 11-month SPEI within the month of July within each 
bin of 30 of RWI in the range of 0-3000. We found a significant correlation between the binned 
averages of RWI and SPEI at the regional-scale under dryer conditions. The tipping point of forests 
decline to drought is predicted by the regression model as SPEItp = -1.64 and RWItp = 0, that is, 
persistence of the water deficit (11 month) with intensity of -1.64 leading to negligible growth for 
the conifer species.  
When climate conditions are wetter (SPEIup > 0.35), the correlation between the binned 
averages of RWI and SPEI is weaker, which we believe is most likely due to soil water and 
atmospheric moisture levels no longer being the dominant factor limiting tree growth. We also 
illustrate a potential application of the derived tipping point (SPEItp = -1.64) through an examination 
of the 2002 extreme drought event in the SWUS conifer forest regions, where the remote-sensing 
based NDVI shows significant different anomalies partitioned by the derived tipping point.  
In addition, types of forests reported different tipping-points (Kaicheng et al., 2015), albeit 
the trees might live in the same hydrothermal environment, which mainly accounted for their 
discrepant resistances to climate forcing (temperature, soil moisture and drought). Thus, the 
tipping-point values deduced from the empirical relationship between tree-ring and drought index 
(SPEI) can be used for forest scientific management and risk assessment.  
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Conclusion and future work 
Following are some viewpoints of how to apply tipping points of forest ecosystem under 
severe droughts to ecological sustainability: (1) Monitoring forest healthy situation based on the 
present published drought index (SPEI). Forest healthy index will be built based on the tipping 
points, and latest SPEI products will be applied to generate the given forest healthy report, which 
may give some suggestions for forest protection under recent climate. (2) Predicting forest healthy 
situation based on the climate model outputs. As already known, state-of-the-art Coupled Model 
Intercomparison Project Phase 5 (CMIP5) Earth System Models (ESMS) produced free state-of-the-
art multi-model datasets from the beginning of the industrial revolution to the near present (1850-
2005), for the past scenery of the world, and; four representative concentration pathways (RCPs) 
simulations from 2005 to the end of the 21st century (2100) for the future sceneries of the world 
(Taylor et al., 2012). Therefore, we can assess forest healthy situation based on the developed forest 
healthy index using future drought index across different RCPs. The anticipated results may 
represent the forest living conditions in the next decades, and also be applied to scientific 
management and risk assessment when approaching policy makers. 
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What we have learned from campus teaching and learning gardens: The UBC Orchard 
Garden and Cultivating Learning Network 
Susan Gerofsky1 
On many university campuses, including the University of British Columbia (UBC) and the 
Freie Universität, Berlin (FUB), students, faculty and staff have taken up the work of creating, 
maintaining and programming organic gardens in the context of university teaching, learning and 
research. This work has arisen as part of an international grassroots movement to create community 
gardens, urban agriculture projects, guerrilla gardening, artists’ gardens and other projects that 
work on a small, local scale towards much larger global goals. These goals may include:  
• cultural, economic and environmental sustainability
• awareness and activism in the face of global climate change
• energy conservation and energy alternatives
• local self-sufficiency and food security
• the promotion of physical and mental health
• community building
• intergenerational and intercultural knowledge building
• valuing Indigenous knowledges and
• a deeper relationship with the more-than-human world.
Accounts of such projects and their implications can be found, for just a few examples, in Gaylie 
2009, 2011; Williams and Brown 2011; Waters 2008; Carpenter and Rosenthal 2011; De Zeeuw and 
Drechsel 2015; Scheub et al. 2016; Kallis 2014. 
This grassroots movement to create small-scale local gardens with global issues in mind can 
be seen as part of the alterglobal movement (Kahn 2010; Pleyers & Touraine 2011), a movement 
which approaches contemporary globalization with a sense of the potency of personal and local 
agency, community and coalition-building among diverse social groups, with the aim of creating 
greater environmental justice and sustainability. The alterglobal movement opposes extremes of 
1 Dr. Susan Gerofsky, Department of Curriculum and Pedagogy, University of British Columbia; 
susan.gerofsky@ubc.ca 
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neo-liberal economics and politics in our globalized world in favour of a more democratic, 
participatory, ecological global system. It is not ‘anti-global’, but rather adopts the slogan, “Another 
world is possible”, with the aim of a more balanced co-existence among human and greater-than-
human ecologies.  
Campus teaching and learning gardens have sprung up at many universities over the past 
ten to fifteen years partly in response to such world-wide movements, but also as part of specific 
efforts to bring greater sustainability and ecological balance to our institutions of higher learning 
and research. Often these gardens have been jointly founded by students and faculty members (for 
example, at UBC Vancouver and Okanagan, the Freie Universität Berlin, the Ecole Normale 
Supérieur (ENS) in Lyon, Portland State University, the University of Toronto, McGill University, the 
University of California at Berkeley, and many others), and the collaboration between students and 
professors has been an important part of an egalitarian, alterglobal ethos guiding these projects. 
Organic food production is a central activity of many of these campus gardens, but they may also 
include a variety of other foci, including work with fibre arts, medicinal plants, scent gardens, food 
forests, Indigenous gardens, building garden structures with natural local materials, establishing 
sustainable local economic structures like farmers’ markets and Community Shared Agriculture 
(CSA) programs, and much more.  
In particular, university campus gardens have focused on issues central to the life of our 
institutions, including research, teaching and community service. Campus gardens can be seen as 
distinct from other community and school gardens and urban agriculture projects in that they are 
embedded in the life and values of the universities, and make use of the special intellectual and 
practical resources available at universities.  
In this paper, I will outline some of the important lessons learned during my first ten years 
as one of the academic advisors at the UBC Orchard Garden project and Cultivating Learning 
Network, taking these as particular exemplars of university grassroots teaching and learning 
gardens worldwide. My hope is that those of us engaged in this hope-full work will be able to learn 
from one another’s experiences, and help establish more sustainable practices as a regenerative 
element of the life of our universities. 
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An introduction to the UBC Orchard Garden and Cultivating Learning Network 
Three teaching and learning gardens, initiated and led by students and teachers at UBC have 
joined together to create a new entity called the Cultivating Learning Network: (1) The 
Intergenerational Landed Learning project at the UBC Farm (henceforth ‘Landed Learning’), (2) the 
UBC Orchard Garden, and (3) Roots on the Roof. Here is an introduction to the three projects, and 
to the Cultivating Learning Network as a whole. 
Landed Learning was established as a project of the UBC Faculty of Education in 2001, when 
the UBC Farm was founded by students and faculty. Based at the Farm’s Children’s Garden, it is a 
program that brings together inner-city elementary school students with Farm Friends (community 
elders and university students) in an intensive year-long urban farming and science learning 
program (see Mayer-Smith, Peterat & Bartosh 2006, 2009 for more details). Each year, five 
elementary schools participate in a program of eleven visits to the UBC Farm, where students work 
with Farm Friends to grow, harvest, cook and compost their choice of vegetables, and learn about 
the science of plants, pollinators and organic agriculture in a non-formal outdoor classroom. 
The UBC Orchard Garden was established in 2005 and expanded in 2010 as a cross-faculty 
project by the UBC Faculties of Education (FoE) and Land and Food Systems (LFS), with participation 
from the School of Architecture and Landscape Architecture (SALA) and the Faculty of Forestry. 
Based in central campus, a short walk away from indoor classrooms in the participating faculties, it 
is an experimental space where students learn hands-on about organic food production and 
marketing, and about teaching across the curriculum in a school garden with the garden as co-
teacher2. Over 500 students each year are involved in classes, workshops, practica, research projects 
and seasonal celebrations at The Orchard Garden3. 
Roots on the Roof  is a student-run roof garden on the roof of UBC’s new Student Union NEST 
2 The concept of ‘garden-as-co-teacher’ has been developed in the research areas of environmental education 
and garden-based learning (GBL) in the US, Canada, Sweden, Australia and the UK. See, for example, Ostertag 
(2015 pp.171-177); Berhan 2008; and the work of researchers like Dilafruz Williams, David Greenwood, Dawn 
Sanders and Amy Cutter-Mackenzie. 
3  See <theorchardgarden.blogspot.ca>, and short films about garden alumni like 
https://vimeo.com/78563019 
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Building on central campus, completed in 2015. As an offshoot project of the Orchard Garden, and 
a club of the student society, it engages students from LFS and the FoE, along with those from other 
faculties including Arts, Sciences and Engineering, in experimental projects in organic food 
production and marketing, teaching and learning across disciplines and cultures, and celebrating 
seasonal events4. 
The Cultivating Learning Network (CLN) brings together these three projects as a unified 
network of teaching and learning gardens, and connects them with related projects on campus, in 
the city and region, and internationally. The CLN has recently established an advisory panel of 
academics from all departments of the FoE who work in areas of sustainability, environmental 
education, garden-based/ outdoor learning and Indigenous epistemologies. The new CLN website 
will include an initial data base of hundreds of lesson ideas for teaching and learning across 
curricular areas with a garden as co-teacher, and will provide a space for communication among 
garden-based educators.  
All three projects are complementary, and collaborate to: 
• Design, maintain and learn about organic food production and sales (CSA boxes, sales to
student-led cafés)
• Develop garden-based learning programs and peer teaching
• Initiate and carry out special projects (for example, medieval bread baking, the Chinese
Market Garden, Arts in the Garden, Lights on the Roof lantern festival)
• Work with faculty and staff to run courses, conferences, summer camps, and collaborations
with schools, community health and arts and environmental groups.
 One five-year nationally-funded project, Think&Eat Green@Schools, was based at Orchard Garden 
and in the CLN. Think&Eat Green@Schools used its 1 million CAD research grant to engage 43 
schools and over 35 community agencies to build school gardens. The project was instrumental in 
establishing the ongoing Vancouver Schools Food Network, based at the Vancouver School Board 
and involving the municipality of Metropolitan Vancouver, local health authorities, and many NGOs 
working in areas of health, education, urban agriculture and community-building. 
4 See < http://blogs.ubc.ca/rootsontheroof/about/history/> for further information. 
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The UBC Orchard Garden 
(photo: Susan Gerofsky). 
Roots on the Roof (photo: Susan Gerofsky). 
Landed Garden (photo: Susan Gerofsky). 
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Best practices we have learned from campus teaching and learning gardens in the Cultivating 
Learning Network 
The course of establishing a thriving network of grassroots, student- and faculty-led 
teaching and learning gardens on our university campus has not always been a smooth process. 
Universities, like other large institutions in our societies, have been caught up in neo-liberal politics 
and economic processes, and the drive to profit from lucrative real estate developments on 
university lands (condominiums, shopping malls and similar developments) has been a powerful 
force at UBC as at other universities over the past few decades. Where land is viewed as equivalent 
to money, even the existence of a small garden closely tied to the academic goals of the university 
may be seen as an obstacle to ‘progress’ and profit (Ostertag, Gerofsky & Scott in press).  
Aside from questions of land tenure for even a small garden, our projects have required 
constant fundraising efforts through multiple small grant applications to pay for seeds and tools, 
workshop materials, and to pay honoraria and small salaries to students who put in many hours of 
unpaid volunteer time in the gardens as well. 
In the years that we have negotiated and sometimes struggled to keep our projects healthy and 
growing, we have learned some ‘best practices’ that apply to teaching and learning gardens in any 
institutional context. They can be summarized in the following three statements: 
a) Undertake multi-level collaboration and integration, which grounds the project, develops
rich content, and makes it flexible and robust. 
b) Show respect for living ecosystems as co-teachers as essential as a way of modelling
empathetic relations with the greater-than-human world. 
c) Do the central work of your institution with the garden, so that the garden is a valued element 
of university (or other institutional) programs, rather than a decorative (and dispensable) add-
on. 
In the following sections, I will elaborate on these three focal areas of best practices. 
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(a) The importance of multi-level collaboration and integration 
CLN garden-based learning projects have undertaken integration across: 
• University faculties and ranks, including undergraduate and graduate students, faculty and
staff
• Disciplines and faculties, including UBC’s Faculties of Education, Land & Food Systems,
Forestry, Landscape Architecture, Engineering, Medicine, Arts and Sciences
• Ages, including people of every age from elementary school students to retirees and elders
• Cultures, making links with school gardens in Ghana, Afghanistan, Turkey, Mexico, Belize,
Bulgaria, Micronesia, Sweden, Australia, the UK, US and across Canada via connections
through international students and faculty colleagues.
• Communities, including collaborations with schools and teachers, environmental groups,
Indigenous communities, health agencies, eco-artists, chefs, urban agriculturalists, the city
government and parks board, youth groups and others.
Additionally, we have worked to integrate: 
• Rational cognition, the senses, emotions, spirituality
• Playful and ‘serious’ modes of learning
• Pleasure and work
• Indigenous and settler ways of knowing
• Arts and sciences
• Propositional and poetic discourses
Taking an egalitarian, inclusive, multidisciplinary, multicultural, intergenerational and 
community-oriented approach to our work has enriched the projects of the CLN in innumerable 
ways. Workshops and studies regularly integrate arts-based and science-based approaches – for 
just a few examples, we have collaborated with visiting mathematical artists in building functional 
mathematical sculptures for the Orchard Garden (a hyperboloid gate and Platonic solids wind 
socks). We have worked with an astrophysicist to develop a workshop on embodied ways to track 
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the course of the sun through the garden year, and photographed this with 6-month exposure 
pinhole cameras. Students from programs in agriculture, nutrition, history, landscape design, music 
education and many other disciplines have collaborated to create interdisciplinary workshops for 
new teachers, and leading visual and performing artists have worked together to find abundance 
and arts-based learning resources in the gardens – for example, teaching ‘weaving invasive species’ 
in collaboration with traditional First Nations weavers. 
By finding ways to be open to diverse ages, disciplines, cultures and knowledges, and 
acknowledging that we can all teach and learn together, the educational mandate of our campus 
gardens is greatly enriched. Integrating a variety of modalities gives poetry to programs already well 
established in scientific discourses, embodying the objectives of STEAM initiatives (Science, 
Technology, Engineering, Arts and Mathematics – that is, STEM with the addition of the arts) and 
brings a sense of balance and well-being to our work in promoting sustainability and environmental 
awareness on campus.  
(b) The importance of showing respect for living ecosystems as co-teachers 
When we first began to talk to campus planners about creating outdoor classrooms for UBC 
students, there was a disconnect across our different ways of envisioning these spaces. The planners 
immediately wanted to know how many seats we needed for a concrete amphitheatre, how many 
electrical outlets, what sort of sound and projection system, screens and whiteboards were needed, 
and whether we wanted a roof to protect the classroom from the rain. Their vision of an outdoor 
classroom was a replication of the existing indoor lecture halls of the university – an amphitheatre 
with raked seating in which a passive audience focuses on an expert lecturer. While this is one 
possible way of thinking about outdoor teaching and learning spaces, it is not necessarily one that 
facilitates new and ecological learning experiences at the university. With its human-made hard 
surfaces, barriers against contact with the living world (soil, plants, insects and other animals, 
weather, the sky, etc.), focus on a single human expert teacher and overwhelming emphasis on 
digital technologies, an outdoor lecture theatre or similar classroom is not very different from an 
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indoor one. 
In our teaching and learning gardens, outdoor classrooms are not just indoor classrooms 
moved outside, and the professor or instructor is not the only teacher. In the outdoor classroom of 
the garden (or forest, park, seaside, river bank or mountain slope), the living world teaches, inspires 
and speaks. Learners are in contact with the world of the outdoors using all their senses, and people 
in the roles of teachers and learners are all also observers at all times, learning from the garden itself 
- and its soil, insects, earthworms, birds, visiting animals, plants - as a teacher.
In acknowledging the garden as co-teacher, we are concerned with developing empathetic 
relationships with living ecosystems. The quality of empathetic relationships with the living world 
is of deep importance in the development of sustainable ways of thinking and living, and plays a 
strong role in the personal histories of many environmental educators. This ‘biophilic’ approach to 
life of all kinds has not necessarily formed an important part of STEM education in the past, but is 
recognized as essential in contemporary approaches to the sciences, climate change and 
environmental education (Fawcett 2005; Cutter-Mackenzie et al 2014; Greenwood 2013).  
The methods developed in Enlightenment/Modernist sciences and technology involved a 
distancing and separation of human researchers from the rest of the living world, with an increasing 
emphasis on logic and rationality and a repression of emotion, spirituality and even respect for 
other, non-human forms of life (Toulmin & Toulmin 1992). This anthropocentric view of the world as 
a collection of resources to be exploited and controlled by humans has been taken beyond the limits 
of sustainability, and has resulted in the environmental and climate crises we now face – 
catastrophic extinctions of species, global warming and other critical situations. Ecological and 
systems thinking entails biophilia and empathy with all forms of life, integrated with rationality and 
logic in the pursuit of scientific understandings. In establishing outdoor classrooms where the living 
world is respected as co-teacher, we begin to develop alternative educational experiences that 
counter the human-centric approaches of modernity. 
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(c) The importance of doing the central work of your institution in the campus teaching and learning 
garden 
When I was a secondary school teacher working to establish a school garden for my high 
school, I learned an important lesson from the Evergreen Foundation, a Canadian NGO that 
supports schoolyard greening projects. Evergreen reminded participating teachers that school 
gardens ought to be doing the central work of the school – that is, teaching the school curriculum – 
if they were to survive. If school gardens were there for other purposes (for example, to be decorative, 
or solely to provide food for the school cafeteria, or to be a meditative space for students and staff), 
they would be in danger of being considered marginal and non-essential to the project of the school, 
and it would be easy to justify paving them over again. 
The same principle applies to campus teaching and learning gardens at universities aiming 
for greater sustainability and environmental awareness. If campus gardens are doing the central 
work of the university – that is, contributing to teaching and learning of university curriculum, to 
academic research, and to community service – then they will be recognized as central to the 
mission of the university. On the other hand, if a campus garden is not contributing directly to 
university-level teaching and learning, research and service, it will be danger of being marginalized 
and eventually lost. It is not enough for a university teaching and learning garden to be beautiful 
and decorative, or to produce organic food; it must also be doing the work that is at the heart of the 
university’s mission. 
The Cultivating Learning Network gardens have been research sites for over a dozen PhD 
and Masters theses (see, for example, Ostertag 2015; Adsit-Morris 2015; Urueta Ortiz 2016; Moore 
2013), diverse faculty research projects resulting in peer-reviewed publications, international 
conference symposia, and scores of university classes and practica each year, across several 
faculties. As we move forward to establish an academic advisory panel, an integrative and 
interactive website and a more central presence in the UBC faculties that sustain us, we are aiming 
to make campus teaching and learning gardens an even more central part of our sustainable 
university focus. Long may our gardens flourish! 
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